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2
Mapp v. Ohio: The First Shot
Fired in the Warren Court's
Criminal Procedure
''Revolution''
Yale Kamisar*

Although Earl Warren ascended to the Supreme Court in 1953,
when we speak of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal
procedure we really mean the movement that got underway half-way
through the Chief Justice's sixteen-year reign. It was the 1961 case of
Mapp v. Ohio, 1 overruling Wolf v. Colorado 2 and holding that the state
courts had to exclude illegally seized evidence as a matter of federal
constitutional law, that is generally regarded as having launched the socalled criminal procedure revolution. 3
* Shortly after this chapter went to press, I received a copy of the manuscript for
Carolyn Long's Mapp v. Ohio: The Origin and Development of the Exclusionary Rule
(University Press of Kansas, 2006). This is a lively, informative and insightful accountand the most comprehensive account I have ever read-of Mapp v. Ohio and its aftermath.
I would have referred to it at various places if it had been available when I wrote my
chapter.
1 367

U.S. 643 (1961).

2 338

U.S. 25 (1949).

3 See,

e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights
and Law Enforcement, 66 Wash.U.L.Q. 11, 12 (1988), observing that in the field of criminal
procedure "the 'real Warren Court' " emerged with the decision in Mapp. Some might
argue that the Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure commenced with Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), establishing an indigent criminal defendant's right to a free
transcript on appeal, at least under certain circumstances. Griffin did foreshadow some of
the cases handed down by the later Warren Court, but "it was only some years after this
decision that a majority of the Court consistently took positions now regarded as characteristic of the Warren Court." Francis A Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The
Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.Ill.L.F. 518, 519 note 4.
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The Obscenity Case that Wasn't
However, anyone who had read the briefs in the Mapp case or heard
the oral argument in the Supreme Court would have thought that it was
an obscenity case. The principal issue seemed to be whether an Ohio
statute criminalizing the mere possession or control of obscene material,
under which Dollree Mapp was convicted and sentenced to prison,
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 Mapp is not only the
most famous search and seizure case in American history, but might also
be called the stealth search and seizure case.
When the Supreme Court granted review in Gideon, 5 the famous
right to counsel case, it asked the lawyers to discuss whether the Court's
holding in Betts v. Brady6 should be reconsidered. 7 As a result, many
assumed that that twenty-year-old precedent would be overturned. (And
it was.) 8 When the Court granted review in Miranda and three companion cases,9 most Court-watchers expected the Court to dispel the uncertainty and confusion generated by Escobedo v. Illinois 10 (a case decided
two years earlier), and to hand down a momentous decision in the police
interrogation-confessions area. (And it did.) But Mapp was not preceded
by advance publicity or discussion. The ruling must have come as a
surprise to almost everyone-including Ms. Mapp's own lawyer.
As the Court pointed out during the oral argument, 11 Ms. Mapp's
brief did not even cite Wolf v. Colorado, the precedent Mapp was to
4 See

text at notes 16-32, 47-50 infra.

5

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon is the subject of a separate
chapter in this volume.
6 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Under the Betts rule, or the "special circumstances" rule, an
indigent defendant charged with a serious non-capital offense such as armed robbery had
to represent himself unless there were special circumstances, e.g., the defendant was
mentally deficient or the case was unusually complicated.
7 See

Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338.

8

Gideon established a "flat" or "automatic" right to appointed counsel in all felony
cases. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that absent a valid waiver, no person
may be incarcerated for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony,
unless represented by counsel.
9 The "Miranda opinion," 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was actually an opinion in four cases:
Miranda v. Arizona, California v. Stewart, Vignera v. New York and Westover v. United
States. Miranda is the subject of a separate chapter in this volume.

10 378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a summary of the wide disagreement over the meaning of
Escobedo-and over what it ought to mean-see YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND
CoNfESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAw AND POLICY 161-62 (1980).

11 See 55 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES· CoNSTITU'fIONAL LAw 1164
(Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1975) (hereinafter Landmark Briefs & Arguments).
It should be noted that the ACLU which had filed an amicus brief in the case, did ask the

YALE KAMISAR

47

overrule. 12 Moreover, when asked by one of the Justices whether "you're
asking us to overrule Wolf against Colorado," 13 the lawyer replied: "No, I
don't believe we are. " 14
The Mapp case arose as follows: 15
Dollree Mapp, a 28-year old black woman, and her daughter by a
former marriage lived on the top floor of a two-family dwelling. One day,
three Cleveland police officers arrived at the dwelling pursuant to
information that (1) a suspect in a recent bombing was hiding out there;
and (2) a large amount of "policy paraphernalia" was hidden in the
house. The police knocked on the door and demanded entrance. However, after calling her lawyer, Miss Mapp refused to admit the police
without a search warrant.
Court to "re-examine" Wolf. But the ACLU only devoted one paragraph of its 21-page brief
to the issue, see id. at 1154, and one commentator aptly described it as "sort of an 'oh, by
the way'" paragraph. LucAs A. PoWE, JR., THE WARREN CouRT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 196
(2000).
12 At one point in his brief, Miss Mapp's lawyer did make an effort to bring his case
within the doctrine of the infamous "stomach pumping" case, Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), maintaining that the police action in Mapp, like the police behavior in
Rochin, was "conduct that shocks the conscience." See Landmark Briefs & Arguments
1103. But the brief made no attempt to deal with, and did not even cite, Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954), which took the position that Rochin was not really a
search and seizure case, but one that turned on police "coercion"-"applied by a physical
assault upon Ithe defendant's] person to compel submission to the use of a stomach pump."
The failure to mention Irvine is quite surprising because, to quote the U.S. Supreme Court,
"the [Ohio Supreme Court] found determinative the fact that the evidence had not been
taken 'from defendant's person by the use of brutal or offensive physical force against
defendant.' " 367 U.S. at 645.

At one point in the oral argument, in response to a direct question, Ms. Mapp's lawyer
did say he thought his case "comes within the doctrine of the Rochin case," but when
asked to specify "lwJhat particular facts" brought it within Rochin, he could only reply: "I
can't say definitely. . . I'm very sorry, but I don't have all of the facts in the case, just the
conclusion that I came to on that." Landmark Briefs & Arguments 1200.
13 Id. at 1165. Although the Justice who asked this question is not identified, it was
probably Justice Frankfurter, the author of the majority opinion in Wolf. Because the
lawyer had referred to him by name, we know that Frankfurter had asked the same
question a few moments earlier, without getting a direct answer. See id. at 1164.

14 No doubt troubled by his colleague's wrong response, or lack of response, to the
question whether he was asking the Court to overrule Wolf, Bernard Berkman, the ACLU
lawyer who followed Ms. Mapp's lawyer to the podium, told the Court at the outset that he
was asking the Court to "reconsider" Wolf. See id. at 1170. But he devoted virtually all of
his time to a discussion of the Ohio obscenity statute.
15 This summary of the facts is based primarily on the account set forth in the Mapp
opinion, 367 U.S. at 644-45. See also the discussion in Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 20-21.
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The police called for reinforcements. Several hours later, when at
least four more officers had arrived on the scene, the police again sought
entrance. When Miss Mapp did not come to the door immediately, the
police gained admittance by breaking open one of the back doors. A short
time later, Miss Mapp's attorney arrived, but the police did not allow
him to enter the house or to see his client.
In the meantime, inside the house, Miss Mapp demanded to see a
search warrant. One officer held up a piece of paper which was said to be
a warrant. Miss Mapp grabbed the paper and put it in her blouse. A
struggle broke out, in the course of which the police recovered the paper.
In light of what the police called Ms. Mapp's "belligerent" behavior in
seizing and trying to hold on to the "search warrant," the police
handcuffed her.
(At the trial, no search warrant was produced by the prosecution.
Nor was this failure ever explained. According to the Ohio Supreme
Court, "considerable doubt" existed as to whether "there ever was any
warrant for the search of defendant's home.")
After being handcuffed, Miss Mapp was forcibly taken upstairs to
her bedroom where the dressers, the closet and some suitcases were
searched. The search soon spread to the rest of the second floor (including the living room and Mapp's daughter's bedroom), and then to the
basement (where a trunk found there was searched). The widespread
search turned up a few "obscene" pamphlets (a far cry from the kind of
porn material one hears about today) for which Miss Mapp was ultimately convicted and ser1tenced to prison. (She claimed she was simply
storing the materials for a former roommate.)
Some twenty years after the decision in Mapp, Justice Potter Stewart, by this time a retired Supreme Court Justice, disclosed the following:
At the conference following [the oral argument in Mapp], a majority
of the Justices agreed that the Ohio statute violated the first and
fourteenth amendments. Justice Tom Clark was assigned the job of
writing the opinion of the Court. What transpired in the month
following our conference on the case is really a matter of speculation
on my part, but I have always suspected that the members of the
soon-to-be Mapp majority had met in what I affectionately call a
"rump caucus" to discuss a different basis for their decision. But
regardless of how they reached their decision, five Justices of the
Court concluded that the fourth and fourteenth amendments required that evidence seized in an illegal search be excluded from
state trials as well as federal ones. Wolf was to be overruled. 16
16 Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp u. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365,
1368 (1983) (second emphasis added).
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A "rump caucus" did take place, but it is unclear which Justices
participated in it or how many there were.
According to one account, Justice Tom Clark played a key role in
transforming Mapp from an obscenity case to a search and seizure case. 17
Although many considered Clark a police-prosecution oriented Justice, 18
his experience as a young lawyer with blatant violations of the Fourth
Amendment had made him a keen student of the law of search and
seizure. 19 As Clark observed, a decade after he had retired from the
Court:
I myself think that the fourth amendment is the most valuable of all
the amendments because it does not matter what you have-if you
have all the money in the world-unless you have the safety of your
home and the privacy of your mind and heart, you have nothing.
Nothing. Someone can take it away, regardless of what you have. 20
Moreover, Justice Clark had been greatly troubled by the "empty
gesture" approach to the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure the Court had taken in the Wolf case. 21 Although Clark had
concurred in the result in Irvine, a case which upheld the admissibility of
evidence produced by admittedly flagrant state police violations of the
Fourth Amendment, 22 he had noted at the outset of his concurring
opinion that "lhJad [he] been here when Wolf was decided," he would
According to B1mNA1m SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 392 (1983) (hereinafter Schwartz), "[tJhe
conference discussion and vote was summed up by Harlan in a letter to Clark." Justice
Harlan wrote, id. at 392-93:
I would have supposed that the Court would have little difficulty in agreeing (as indeed
I thought the whole Court had) that a state prohibition against mere knowing
possession of obscene material, without any requirement of a showing that such
possession was with a purpose to disseminate the offensive matter, contravenes the
Fourteenth Amendment, in that such a statute impermissibly deters freedom of belief
and expression, if indeed it is not tantamount to an effort at "thought control."
17 See

Schwartz. supra note 16, at 393.

1s This was largely a result of Clark's sharp dissents in Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996). See generally Note, Justice
Tom C. Clark's Unconditional Approach to Individual Rights in the Courtroom, 64 Tex. L.
Rev. 421 (1985).
19 See Paul R. Baier, Justice Clark, the Voice of the Past, and the Exclusionary Rule, 64
Tex. L. Rev. 415, 417, 419 (1985).

2o Tom C. Clark, Some Notes on the Continuing Life of the Fourth Amendment, 5 Am.
J. Crim. L. 275, 276 (1977) (based on an April, 1977 lecture delivered at the University of
Texas Law School).

21 See

Baier, supra note 19, at 419.

22 See the discussion of Irvine v. California, 34 7 U.S. 128 (1954), in the text at notes
126-48.
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have imposed the exclusionary rule on the states. 23 And he had ended his
Irvine concurrence with the thought that "[p]erhaps strict adherence to
the tenor of [Wolf] may produce needed converts for its extinction. " 24
According to one account, no sooner had Clark left the conference
room, where he had agreed to write the opinion of the Court overturning
Mapp's conviction on First Amendment grounds, than he turned to
Justices Black and Brennan, who were standing in the elevator with
him, and asked: "[W]ouldn't this be a good case to apply the exclusionary rule and do what Wolf didn't do?" 25 According to this account, "[i]n
his discussion with Brennan and Clark, [Justice Black] showed willingness to agree to a decision overruling Wolf .... though he indicated that
he still had difficulty in doing it on Fourth Amendment grounds alone. " 26
However, one of Chief Justice Warren's biographers tells a different
story. According to him, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan
agreed with Justice Douglas, the only Wolf dissenter still on the Court,
that Wolf should be overruled, and they did so quite early. But because
nobody else supported this position at the time, the vote in conference
was to overturn Mapp's conviction on First Amendment grounds. 27
When Clark changed his mind shortly after the conference, the
foursome still needed a fifth vote to topple Wolf The best bet was Hugo
Black. According to this account, Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas and Brennan (but not Clark) then visited Justice Black in his
chambers and persuaded him to join them. 28
The author of a recent biography of Hugo Black is the only one I
could find who specifically stated that both Clark's meeting in the
elevator with Black and Brennan and the Warren-Douglas-Brennan
meeting with Black in the latter's chambers took place. 29 In any event, it
seems to be undisputed that Justice Douglas was the first to throw out
the idea that Wolf should be overruled30 and that Black was the last to
join the anti-Wolf group.
23

347 U.S. at 138.

24

Id. at 139.

25 See

Schwartz, supra note 16, at 393.

26 Id. Concurring in the judgment in Wolf, Justice Black had "agree[d] with what
appears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is
not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate." 338 U.S. at 39-40.
27

See

28

See id. at 375.

29

See

30

See id. at 555; Powe, supra note 11, at 196; Schwartz, supra note 16, at 393.

Eo CRAY, CHIEF JusTICE,

ROGER

K.

A

BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN

NEWMAN, HuGo BLACK:

374 (1997).

A BIOGRAPHY 555-56 (1994).

YALE KAMISAR

51

Before learning that Justice Clark had changed his mind in favor of
deciding the Mapp case on search and seizure grounds, Justice Douglas
had prepared a draft opinion "apply[ing] the Fourth Amendment with
full force to the states, making the exclusionary rule part and parcel of
the constitutional guarantee." 31 (Douglas's draft opinion was never circulated because of Clark's change of mind just after the conference.) 32
Getting and holding Justice Black's vote was no small feat. For, as
noted earlier/3 concurring in Wolf, Black had taken the position that the
exclusionary rule was not a command of the Fourth Amendment itself,
but merely a judicially created rule of evidence. Twelve years later, he
was "still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
would be enough to [exclude evidence] seized from [a defendant] in
violation of its commands," 34 but by this time he had found what he
considered the true basis for the exclusionary rule:
Reflection on the problem ... has led me to conclude that when the
Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule. 33
One passage in Justice Clark's Mapp opinion seems to support
Justice Black's view of the search and seizure exclusionary rule. It talks
about the " 'intimate relation' " between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and how the two Amendments "express 'supplementing phases of
the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate large areas of
personal privacy.' ":i. Did Justice Clark really believe this or, anxious to
keep Black on board, did Clark write this in order to humor Black? Many
years later, Justice Clark recalled:
Finally, in 1961 we got the five [votes] to overrule Wolf. .. . I had to
convince Justice Black. He did not want to swallow the fourth
amendment; he wanted to bring in the fifth. And so we sat down
and worked in the fourth and had the fourth and fifth mentioned
together. If you still do not understand it, I do not either! But we
overruled Wolf ... 37
31

See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 393.

32

Id.

33

See note 26 supra.

34

367 U.S. at 661 (Black, J. concurring in Mapp).

:!5 Id.

at 662.

36

See 367 U.S. at 656-57.

37

See Clark, supra note 20, at 279.
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Professor Lucas Powe, a commentator who rarely uses strong words,
calls Justice Black's rationale for the search and seizure exclusionary
rule "preposterous." 38 Black's theory does leave much to be desired, but
Powe goes too far.
The famous Boyd case39 viewed the compulsory production of incriminating papers as the equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure
and the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
as a form of compulsory self-incrimination. 40 Moreover, in his celebrated
dissent in the Olmstead case, 41 Justice Louis Brandeis maintained that
the use in a criminal prosecution of facts ascertained by a violation of
the Fourth Amendment "must be deemed a violation of the Fifth." 42
Nevertheless, Justice Black's theory of the exclusionary rule is badly
flawed and, so far as I know, nobody subscribes to it today.
First of all, at the time of Mapp the prevailing view had long been
that the physical evidence typically excluded in search and seizure cases,
e.g., drugs and weapons, was beyond the scope of the protection provided
by the Self-Incrimination Clause. 43 The Clause was said only to furnish
protection against "testimonial compulsion. " 44
Second, although Justice Black may have believed that the privilege
against self-incrimination was "incorporated" by the Fourteenth Amend38

See Powe, supra note 11, at 196-97.

39 Boyd
40 See

v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

id. at 630-35. See also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925).

41

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

42

See id. at 4 78-79.

43 See FRED E. INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION WHAT CAN AN AccusED PERSON BE COMPELLED TO
Do, 3-8, 87 (1950); CHARLES T. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 263-66 (1st ed. 1954); EDMOND MoRGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 140-42 (1957); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2263, 2265
(3d ed. 1940). Moreover, as pointed out in Allen, supra note 15, at 25-26, "a Fifth
Amendment theory of the exclusionary rule can probably not be justified either by
historical or analytical considerations." See also Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years
Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 Minn.L.Rev. 1083, 1088-90
(1959); Jack B. Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure
Practices, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 150, 160-61 (1962).

44 Since the discussion in Mapp, the Court has made this even more clear. In
Schmerber v. California, 383 U.S. 757 (1966), upholding the taking of a blood sample from
an intoxicated driver, over his objection, the Court observed that the privilege "protects an
accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State
with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature and that the withdrawal of blood
and use of the analysis in question does not involve compulsion to these ends." Id. at 761.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 2218 (1967), held that requiring a defendant to appear in a
lineup and to utter the words "put the money in the bag" does not violate the privilege.
See generally 2 WAYNER. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 7.2
(2d ed. 1999).
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ment and binding on the states, a majority of the Court did not. 45 It was
not until 1964 that the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination was to be "enforced against the States under
the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment. " 46
Justice Clark probably would not have needed Justice Black's vote
nor have had to put up with Black's Fifth Amendment theory of the
exclusionary rule if-instead of "simply 'reach[ing] out' to overrule
Wolf' 47-the Court had ordered reargument of the case and directed the
lawyers to reexamine Wolf. If this step had been taken, Justice Stewart,
who had been "shocked" by the Court's transformation of Mapp into a
search and seizure case, 48 most likely would have voted to overrule Wolf
the second time around. As he stated in a public lecture some years after
he had retired from the Court:
I believed then [at the time of Mapp], and I believe now, that the
exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, not as a "right"
explicitly incorporated in the fourth amendment's prohibitions, but
as a remedy necessary to ensure that those prohibitions are observed
in fact. Thus, although I did not join in the Court's opinion in the
Mapp case-because it decided an issue that was not before the
Court-I agree with its conclusion that the exclusionary rule is
necessary to keep the right of privacy secured by the fourth amendment from "remain[ing] an empty promise. " 49
Justice Clark's response to the dissenters' charge that the overruling of Wolf was not properly before the Court is not convincing: "Although appellant ... did not insist that Wolf be overruled [that is a gross
understatement], the amicus curiae ... did urge the Court to overrule
Wolf [that is an overstatement of considerable proportions]." 50
,15 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947). Both cases were overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, discussed in the next sentence.

46

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).

47

367 U.S. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

48 See

Stewart, supra note 16, at 1368:

I was shocked when Justice Clark's proposed Court opm10n reached my desk. I
immediately wrote him a note expressing my surprise and questioning the wisdom of
overruling an important doctrine in a case in which the issue was not briefed, argued
or discussed by the state courts, by the parties' counsel or at our conference following
the oral argument. After my shock subsided, I wrote a brief memorandum concurring
in the judgment on first and fourteenth amendment grounds, and agreeing with
Justice Harlan's dissent that the issue which the majority decided was not properly
before the Court.
49 Id.

50

at 1389.

367 U.S. at 646 note 3.
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Justice Douglas tried to brush off the dissenters' protests with what
one commentator551 called "light-hearted assurances" that the Justices
already knew all the arguments for and against the exclusionary rule.5 52
I share the view that the better course would have been to order the
reargument of the case directed to the issue of the Wolf rule. 53 N evertheless, there is something to be said for Douglas's view. After all, as Judge
(later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo observed more than three decades
before the Mapp case was decided (in a portion of his famous Defore
opinion that very few law professors have ever taken seriously): "To
what [has been] written [about the exclusionary rule] little of value can
be added. " 54
Let us now take a look at some of what had been written about the
exclusionary rule prior to Mapp.

Historical Perspective: The Rules Governing the Admissibility of
Illegally Seized Evidence Prior to Mapp
1. The Weeks Case and the Federal Exclusionary Rule
The 1914 Weeks case55 established the federal exclusionary rule.
Although this must surprise many readers of Burger Court and Rehnquist Court search and seizure opinions, nowhere in Weeks is the
exclusionary rule called a "remedy" nor is there any discussion, or even
mention, of the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule versus the effectiveness of alternatives such as tort remedies or internal self-discipline.''6
5!

Allen, supra note 15, at 22-23.

52 See

367 U.S. at 671 (Douglas, J., concurring):

[S]ubject to the sound discretion of a court, all arguments must at last come to a halt.
This is especially so as to an issue about which this Court said last year that "The
arguments of its antagonists and of its proponents have been so many times marshaled
as to require no lengthy elaboration here." Elkins v. United States, [364 U.S. 206, 216
(1960)].
53 Allen,

supra note 15, at 22.

54

People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). Of course, in this very
opinion, Judge Cardozo proceeded to write some of the most famous lines ever written on
the subject. If the case against the exclusionary rule had to be reduced to one or two sound
bites, it would be hard to do better than to quote from Cardozo's opinion, id. at 587, 588:
[According to the search and seizure exclusionary rule], [t]he criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered.
* * *

[If this court adopted the exclusionary rule], the pettiest peace officer would have it in
his power, through overzeal or indiscretion, to confer immunity upon an offender for
crimes the most flagitious.
55

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

56 Indeed the Weeks rule or federal exclusionary rule was never called an "exclusionary
rule" until several decades after Weeks was decided. See Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should)
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As Francis Allen has pointed out, the Weeks opm10n "contains no
language that expressly justifies the [exclusionary] rule by reference to a
supposed deterrent effect on police officials." 57
Nor is the notion of deterrence expressed for the next thirty-five
years-in the long interim between Weeks and Wolf. No doubt the Court
that decided Weeks and the Court that adhered to its doctrine in
subsequent decades expected, or at least hoped, that law enforcement
officials would not be so ignorant of, or indifferent to, the search and
seizure rules worked out in the courts as to be unaffected by them, but
there is no suggestion in Weeks or the search and seizure cases decided
during the next thiry-five years that the exclusionary rule's survival
depended on proof that it was significantly affecting police behavior.
In excluding private papers seized from an illegal search of defendant's home, a unanimous Weeks Court, per Justice Day, took the
position that if a federal official "acted without sanction of law" in
conducting a search, a court should not-by admitting the evidence
seized by the official-"affirm" or "sanction" the search or seizure after
the event:
The United States Marshall ... acted without sanction of law ...
and under color of his office undertook to make a search of private
papers in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition against
such action. . . . To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by
judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action. 58
Moreover, as Justice Brennan observed seventy years later, the
Weeks Court "expressly recognized that the commands of the Fourth
Amendment were addressed to both the courts and the Executive
Branch": 3i,
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power
the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an Empirical Proposition?,
16 Creighton L.Rev. 561, 590 & note 162 (1983).
37

Allen, supra note 3, at 536 note 90. Even Chief Justice Burger, one of the
exclusionary rule's most severe critics, recognized, before ascending to the Supreme Court,
that Weeks "rest ls I on the Court's unwillingness to give even tacit approval to official
defiance of constitutional provisions by admitting evidence secured in violation of the
Constitution. The idea of deterrence may be lurking between the lines of the opinion but is
not expressed." Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1964).

as 232 U.S. at 393-94.
5ii Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, J., dissenting in United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897,936 (1984).
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and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of
such power and authority. . . . [The Fourth Amendment's] protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty
of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under
our federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of
those who execute the criminal laws of the country . . . to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution and to which [all] people have a
right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. 60
In the thirty-five years following Weeks, the Court had very little to
say about the rationale for the exclusionary rule. 61 However, the stirring
Holmes-Brandeis dissents in the famous wiretapping case, Olmstead v.
United States, 62 do shed light on the original basis and purpose of the
exclusionary rule. In the course of urging the Court to extend the Weeks
doctrine to situations where the federal government had not violated the
Constitution, or even federal law, but only a state wiretapping statute,
Justices Holmes and Brandeis embellished the Weeks Court's reasoning:
[N]o distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge. If the existing code does not
permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business
[obtaining evidence by an unlawful act], it does not permit the judge
to allow such inequities to succeed. 63
The Court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the
law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks
legal redress. Then aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is
denied in order to maintain respect for the law; in order to promote
confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the
judicial process from contamination. 64
To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face. 65
The Holmes-Brandeis dissents underscore that the exclusionary rule, at
least in the pre-Wolf era, was based on principle-one might also say
60

Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92 (emphasis added).

61

See Kamisar, supra note 56, at 601-06.

fi 2

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 471 (1928).

63

Id. at 470. (Holmes, J., dissenting.)

6J

Id. at 484. (Brandeis, J., dissenting.)

65

Id. at 485. (Brandeis, J., dissenting.)
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that it had an important symbolic quality-not on estimates of how
significantly the exclusion of evidence affects police conduct.
The famous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis, and the Weeks case
itself, were based on what has been called the "'one-government'
conception" or the "unitary model of a government and a prosecution." 66
According to this view, by excluding illegally seized evidence "the court
stops the entire government, of which it is a part, from consummating a
wrongful course of conduct begun but by not means ended when the
police invade the defendant's privacy." 67 But the Wolf Court took a very
different view of the exclusionary rule.
2. Wolfv. Colorado
In Wolf, a 5-4 majority, per Frankfurter, J., resolved "the tension
produced by the recognition of the objective of fair procedure, on the one
hand, and the demands of federalism, on the other" 68 in favor of
federalism. The Court had no hesitation in saying that "[t]he security of
one's privacy against arbitrary invasion by the police-which is at the
core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society" and thus
"enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause." 69 But
"the ways of enforcing such a basic right" was another matter. 70
According to the Wolf Court, excluding the illegally seized evidence
was only one among a range of options. A state court could reject the
66 Thomas Schrock & Robert Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251, 255 (1974). But see Larry Yackle, The
Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 335, 417 (1978) maintaining
that although the approach to the exclusionary rule in the Holmes-Brandeis Olmstead
dissents is related to the approach taken in Weeks, it is also somewhat different.
67

See id. Consider, too, Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, J., dissenting in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 933, 938 (1984):
[Bly admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary becomes a part of what is in
fact a single government action prohibited by the terms of the [Fourth] Amendment.

***
[The Weeks Court] recognized that, if the Amendment is to have any meaning, police
and the courts cannot be regarded as constitutional strangers to each other; because
the evidence-gathering role of the police is directly linked to the evidence-admitting
function of the courts, an individual's Fourth Amendment rights may be undermined
as completely by one as by the other.

In Leon, the majority adopted a so-called good faith (actually a "reasonable mistake")
exception to the search and seizure exclusionary rule.
68 Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal
Justice, 8 DePaul L. Rev. 213, 240 (1959).
69

338 U.S. at 27-28.

70 See

id. at 28:
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exclusionary rule so long as it relied on some other remedy (such as a
private tort action against the offending officer(s) or the internal discipline of the police) "which, if consistently enforced, would be equally
effective." 71 (The Court gave no indication whether or how it would go
about determining if an alternative to the exclusionary rule was being
"consistently enforced.")
As one critic expressed it, the author of the Wolf opinion performed
"the unusual, if not unprecedented, feat of simultaneously creating a
constitutional right and denying the most effective remedy for violation
of that right." 72 As another critic put it, "the Wolf case leaves the federal
'right' of privacy ... more largely in the realm of wish than reality." 73
Moreover, by "driving a wedge between [the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure] and the exclusionary rules," 74 "inject[ing] the instrumental rationale of deterrence of police misconduct
into [the Court's] discussion of the exclusionary rule," 75 and "using the
empirically-based, consequentialist rationale of deterrence as support for
[the Court's] refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to the states," 76 the
Wolf opinion not only made the result reached in that case seem more
palatable, but it planted the seeds of destruction for the exclusionary
rule-in federal as well as state cases. 77

** *
But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order ....
[W]hat remedies against [such arbitrary conduct] should be afforded, the means by
which the right should be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so
dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring from an
allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.
71 Id. at 31. "We cannot ... regard it as a departure from basic standards," maintained
Frankfurter, "to remand [the victims of illegal searches], together with those who emerge
scatheless from a search, (to remedies other than the exclusionary rule]." Id.

72 T. S. L. Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 Harv.L.Rev.
1304 (1951).
73 Francis A. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil
Liberties, 45 111.L.Rev. 1, 30 (1950). See also Allen, supra note 15, at 5: "The basic difficulty
was that in [Wolf] the Court's reach had exceeded its grasp . . . The federal 'right of
privacy' was relegated to the tender mercies of the state for its enforcement."

74 William J. Mertens & Silas J. Wasserstrom, Foreword: The Good Faith Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo. L.J. 365,
380 (1981).
75 Id.

at 379.

76 Id.

77 Consider Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, J., dissenting in Leon, supra note 67,
at 931, 938-40:
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Justice Frankfurter appears to have been heavily influenced by
Judge (later Justice) Cardozo's famous 1926 opinion in People v. Defore,
the New York case that had rejected the exclusionary rule when the
states still had an option. 78 Cardozo had noted that there was no
shortage of alternatives to the exclusionary rule: "The officer might have
been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression." 79
Although Justice Frankfurter's list of other remedies was not as extensive as Cardozo's (Frankfurter did not include resisting the officer!), the
Wolf opinion, too, "smells of the lamp."
Thus, the temptation to attack, and to defeat, Justice Frankfurter
on his own battleground must have been strong. Justice Murphy, who
wrote the principal dissent in Wolf, yielded to that temptation. He
examined the other available remedies 80 and reached what he called the
At bottom, the Court's decision turns on the proposition that the exclusionary rule is
merely a " 'judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right.' "
The germ of that idea is found in Wolf u. Colorado, and although I had thought that
such a narrow conception of that rule had been forever put to rest by our decision in
Mapp u. Ohio, it has been revived by the present Court and reaches full flower with
today's decision.

* * *
[T]he question whether the exclusion of evidence would deter future police misconduct
was never considered a relevant concern in the early cases from Weeks to Olmstead . ... A new phase in the history of the rule, however, opened with the Court's
discussion in Wolf. . . . Notwithstanding the force of the Weeks doctrine that the
Fourth Amendment required exclusion, a state court was free to admit illegally seized
evidence, according to the Court in Wolf, so long as the State had devised some other
"effective" means of vindicating a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
Twelve years later, in Mapp ... however, the Court restored the original understanding of the Weeks rule, by overturning the holding in Wolf and repudiating its
rationale..
In the [Mapp] Court's view, the exclusionary rule was not one among a
range of options to be selected at the discretion of judges; it was "an essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" ....
Despite [the statements in Mapp], however, the Court since Calandra [v. United
States, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), which took into account only the deterrence rationale in
holding that a grand jury witness may not decline to answer questions on the ground
they were based on illegally seized evidence] has gradually pressed the deterrence
rationale for the [exclusionary] rule back to center stage.
78

150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926).

79

Id. at 587.

so 338 U.S. at 41. (Murphy, J., joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting.) It is important to
compare the exclusionary rule with "currently available" alternatives. There is no shortage
of theoretically possible ways, aside from the exclusion of evidence, to make the Fourth
Amendment viable. As I have said elsewhere, Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World"
of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 537, 564 (1990),
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"inescapable" conclusion that "but one remedy exists to deter violations
of the search and seizure clause"-the exclusionary rule. 81
Justice Murphy's belittling of the available alternatives to the exclusionary rule might have been a mistake in strategy. The better course
might have been to avoid attacking Frankfurter on the grounds he chose,
but to underscore the "one-government" approach that pervades both
Weeks and the Olmstead dissents, an approach that gives no weight to
the availability of possible alternatives to the exclusionary rule. But
surely Justice Murphy's disparagement of the available alternatives to
the exclusionary rule was well-founded. 82
Justice Stewart may have summed up the situation as well as
anyone when, shortly after stepping down from the court, he observed:
Taken together, the currently available alternatives to the exclusionary rule satisfactorily achieve some, but not all, of the necessary
functions of a remedial measure. They punish and perhaps deter the
grossest of violations, as well as government policies that legitimate
those violations. They compensate some of the victims of the most
"the problem is not a lack of imagination or intellectual capacity. Rather, it is a lack of
political will."
As one commentator has recently reminded us, Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the
Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 60 note 289 (1994), ever
since the 1930s, commentators have been underscoring the inadequacy of existing tort
remedies against offending police officers and proposing what are now called "fortified"
tort remedies. But nothing has come of any of these proposals. Do we have any reason to
expect similar proposals made in our day to fare any better?
81

338 U.S. at 44.

82 By the time of Wolf a number of commentators had already called attention to the
ineffectiveness of alternatives to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., LESTER ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 28-31 (1947); Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation
to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 346 (1936); William T. Plumb, Jr.,
Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 386-88 (1939); Comment, Judicial
Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 Yale L.J. 144, 146-56 (1948). Since then, the
number of commentators deprecating the available alternatives to the exclusionary rule
has grown to the point where it is fair to say that there is an overwhelming consensus that
all the available alternatives are woefully inadequate. The classic article is Caleb Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1955). See
also, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 378-79, 429-30 (1974); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and
Constitutional Law: "Here I go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C.L. Rev. 1559, 1606
(1996); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 Colum.L.Rev. 247, 284-86
(1988); Pierre J. Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and
Damage Remedies, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 875, 907-13 (1982); and William A.
Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule,
69 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1386-1410 (1981). But see Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 111, 112 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck
the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 364.
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egregious violations. But they do little, if anything, to reduce the
vast majority of fourth amendment violations-the frequent infringements motivated by commendable zeal, not condemnable malice. For these violations, a remedy is required that inspires the
police officer to channel his enthusiasm to apprehend a criminal
toward the need to comply with the dictates of the fourth amendment. There is only one such remedy-the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. 83

***
Justice Frankfurter often remarked that "[o]n the question you ask
depends the answer you get." 84 He illustrated his point in the Wolf case
by formulating one of the longest and most convoluted "questions
presented for consideration" ever to appear in a Supreme Court opinion:
The precise question for consideration is this: Does a conviction by a
State court for a State offense deny the "due process of law"
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence
that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances
which would have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for
violation of a federal law in a court of the United States because
there deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment as
applied in Weeks ... ?85
The question presented in Wolf could easily have been phrased
differently. For example:
The question for consideration is whether a state conviction resting
on evidence secured in violation of a right so important as to be
deemed "basic to a free society" may be allowed to stand without
making the courts themselves accomplices in disobedience of the
constitutional command. 86 OrThe question presented is whether we can admit evidence produced
by police conduct which violates the security of one's privacy against
arbitrary invasion by government officials-a right basic to a free
society-without affording police lawlessness the cloak of law. 87 OrThe question for consideration is whether a failure to put a curb on
the use of evidence obtained by illegal state searches and seizures in
state prosecutions would only invite the very police methods deemed
83 Stewart,

supra note 16, at 1388-89 (emphasis added).

84 HENRY FRIENDLY,

85

BENCHMARKS

318, 319 (1967).

338 U.S. at 25-26.

86 Cf.
87

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).

Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.).

62

MAPP v. OHIO

inconsistent with the concept of human rights enshrined in the
history and legal documents of our people. 88 OrIn three other cases decided today, 89 we have reversed state convictions based on "involuntary" confessions without disputing the
assertion that "[c]hecked with external evidence, [the] confessions
in each case are inherently believable [and] not shaken by anything
that occurred at the trial. " 90 The question presented is whether the
problem of coerced confessions and the problem of unreasonable
searches or seizures can be treated separately for purposes of
Fourteenth Amendment due process without establishing an indefensible double standard in defining the requirements of due process
as they relate to state criminal proceedings. 91
It might be objected that these formulations of the question are so
appealing from the defendant's viewpoint that they suggest an answer in
his favor. But if the alternative formulations of the question lead the
reader to answer them as the writer wishes, the same may be said for
the question Justice Frankfurter actually posed in Wolf. Moreover, the
alternative formulations of the question presented I have offered are
based almost entirely on how the author of the Wolf opinion elsewhere
viewed the question of admitting unconstitutionally or illegally obtained
evidence in other Supreme Court cases. 92
In suggesting alternative ways of stating the question presented in
the Wolf case I have assumed that the case stands for the proposition
88

Cf Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.).

89

See Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). All three opinions of the Court were
written by Justice Frankfurter.
90 Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in Watts and dissenting in the companion
cases, 338 U.S. at 58. See also Justice Frankfurter, observing in Rochin, supra note 12, at
173: "[Coerced confessions) are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though
statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency."

9l

Cf. Allen, supra note 73, at 29:

"In both situations [coercive police interrogation and illegal searches] the perils arise
primarily out of the procedures employed to acquire the evidence rather than from
dangers of the incompetency of the evidence so acquired. Furthermore, if the demands
of federalism are not such as to deny to the Court power to supervise the interrogating
practices of state police officers in the interest of procedures most likely to preserve the
integrity of basic individual immunities, such supervision of police practices in the
interest of preserving basic rights of privacy seems likewise justifiable. Yet the
consequence of the decision [in Wolf] . . . is rigidly to separate the two problems
[searches and confessions) and to create a dubious double standard in the definition of
the requirements of due process as they relate to state criminal proceedings."
92 See

notes 86-90 supra.
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that what would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment if carried out
by a federal official constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
if committed by a state officer. This is not entirely clear. Wolf could
conceivably have stood, or have come to stand, for the proposition that
only certain "gross" or "aggravated" unreasonable searches or seizures-only those violations of the Fourth Amendment that strike at its
very "core" 93-offend Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.
However, if this were the meaning of Wolf, then whether a given
search by state officers was not only unlawful but sufficiently "outrageous" to offend Fourteenth Amendment Due Process would turn on its
particular facts. But no facts whatever are given about the search that
occurred in Wolf. Not by Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
nor by any of the concurring or dissenting Justices.
Even if one were to read every word written by the five members of
the Court who filed opinions in the case, one would have no idea who
Wolf was (a practicing physician) or what crime he was convicted of
(conspiracy to commit abortion) or what evidence was seized (appointment books from his office). As Justice Jackson pointed out five years
later in his Irvine plurality opinion, "the opinions in Wolf were written
entirely in the abstract. " 94
So far as one can tell, the Wolf case involved not a "shocking" or
"aggravated" illegal search, but a "routine" one. If "the basic right to
protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police" 95 were only violated
when state police committed certain kinds of violations of the Fourth
Amendment, the Wolf Court would have had no need and no reason to
reach the difficult question whether a violation of ''the basic right ...
demands the exclusion of logically relevant evidence." 96 The first order of
business would have been to decide whether the illegal search by the
Colorado police constituted the kind of illegal search that violated "the
basic right."
Although he did not address the question explicitly, Justice Frankfurter seemed to equate the substantive protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures provided by the Fourteenth Amendment with the
specific guarantee of the Fourth. He seemed to say that even though the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require the exclusion of the resulting
93 Cf. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27 (Frankfurter, J.): "The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic
to a free society."
94 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954). Justice Jackson then proceeded to
discuss the facts in Wolf. See id.
95

Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28 (Frankfurter, J.).

96 Jd.
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evidence, the Amendment is violated when state police conduct any
unreasonable search and seizure. 97
Moreover, while concurring and dissenting opinions do not necessarily constitute the most accurate interpretations of majority opinions, it is
at least noteworthy that concurring Justice Black "agree[d] with the
conclusion of the Court that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
'unreasonable searches and seizures' is enforceable against the states," 98
and Justice Murphy, author of the principal dissent, "agree[d] with the
Court that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits activities which are
prescribed by the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment."99

In any event, a decade later, in Elkins v. United States, 100 any
disagreement over whether, as a result of Wolf, the Fourteenth Amendment had "incorporated" the substantive provisions of the Fourth
Amendment was resolved in favor of "incorporation." Ironically, Elkins
interpreted the Wolf opinion in a way that evoked strong protests from
its author, Justice Frankfurter. 101
97 See 338 U.S. at 28, 33. For the view that the best reading of Wolf is that it viewed
the Fourteenth Amendment as "incorporating" the substantive provisions of the Fourth
Amendment but not the exclusionary rule, see Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the
Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process Test Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 261, 267 note 43; Kamisar, supra note 43, at
1101-08. See also Allen, supra note 15, at 9, pointing out that although there is no
indication that the search of Dr. Wolfs office was aggravated or egregious "the Court had
apparently treated the police behavior in Wolf as violating the defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment rights."
98 Id.

at 39.

99 Id.

at 41.

100

364 U.S. 206 (1960).

101

Dissenting in Elkins, 364 U.S. at 206-07, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Clark,
Harlan and Whittaker, JJ., maintained that the Wolf opinion had stated that "only what
was characterized as the 'core of the Fourth Amendment,' not the Amendment itself, is
enforceable against the States." But in his opinion of the Court in Wolf Justice Frankfurter
never said that "only ... the 'core of the Fourth Amendment,' not the Amendment itself'
applies to the states. What he did say was: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society" and therefore "enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause."
338 U.S. at 25-26. Moreover, as noted earlier, Justice Frankfurter never discussed whether
the illegal search that took place in Wolf did violate the "core of the Fourth Amendment";
in fact, he did not discuss the search at all.

It may strike many as anomalous for a majority of the Court to interpret an earlier
opinion differently than the author of that opinion. But Elkins was not the only time
Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissent maintaining that the majority had misread one of his
earlier opinions for the Court. The same thing had happened six years earlier in Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). Then, too, Frankfurter had written an angry dissent
insisting that the Court had misread one of his earlier opinions (Rochin, supra note 12).
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Elkins overturned the "silver platter" doctrine, the rule that a
federal prosecutor may use evidence illegally seized by a state officer in a
federal case so long as the evidence "secured by state authorities is
turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." 102
Although Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Elkins, noted
that "we are not here directly concerned" with "the ultimate determination in Wolf' 103 (the holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require the state courts to exclude illegally seized evidence), "Wolfs
underlying constitutional doctrine" 104 was another matter:
[N]othing could be of greater relevance to the present inquiry than
the underlying constitutional doctrine which Wolf established. For
there it was unequivocally determined by a unanimous Court [on
this point] that the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by
state officers ....
The foundation upon which the admissibility of state-seized evidence
in a federal trial originally rested-that unreasonable state searches
did not violate the Federal Constitution-thus disappeared in
1949. 105
Not surprisingly, Mapp relied heavily on what might be called Wolfs
initial or underlying holding-that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
had "incorporated" the substantive provisions of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp took "incorporation" of the Fourth Amendment one step
further:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction
of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. . . . [I]n
extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically
and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an esMoreover, Frankfurter was not the only Justice to have this experience. In Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Court interpreted Justice Brennan's majority opinion in United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (a landmark case dealing with the right to counsel at
lineups), differently than he did. Brennan dissented. The same thing happened to Brennan
again in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
102 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949). See generally Kamisar, supra
note 97.
103

364 U.S. at 214.

104 Id.

105 Id.

at 213.
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sential part of the right to privacy-be also insisted upon as an
essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. 106
3. Rochin v. California
Rochin, the noisome "stomach pumping" case, 107 demonstrates that
even in pre-Mapp days, even when the evidence seized was indisputably
trustworthy (it is hard to think of any evidence more trustworthy than
morphine capsules taken from a defendant's stomach), the sky was not
the limit for state law enforcement officials. Rochin arose as follows: 108
Three Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs broke into defendant's
room. When they spotted two capsules on a night stand near defendant's
bed, they asked what they were. Rochin responded by grabbing the
capsules and putting them in his mouth. A struggle ensued, in the course
of which the deputies tried forcibly to extract the items from Rochin's
mouth. But he managed to swallow them. (The California courts found
that the deputies had unlawfully assaulted and battered defendant while
they were in his room.)
Rochin was then handcuffed and taken to a hospital. There, at the
deputies' direction and against defendant's will, a doctor forced an
emetic solution through a tube in Rochin's stomach. This "stomach
pumping" caused Rochin to vomit up the two capsules, which turned out
to contain morphine.
Even though Wolf was on the books, the police misconduct in
Rochin was more than the Supreme Court could bear. It reversed
Rochin's conviction without a dissent. 109 Justice Frankfurter delivered
the opinion of the Court. Applying the "general considerations" of due
process "to the circumstances of the present case," 110 he declared:
106 Mapp,

107 Rochin

367 U.S. at 655-56.
is discussed briefly in note 12 supra.

108 This summary of the facts is based on the account set forth in the Rochin opinion,
342 U.S. at 166-67.
109 However, both Justice Black and Justice Douglas wrote concurring opinions,
expressing strong disagreement with the approach taken by Justice Frankfurter, author of
the majority opinion. Black rejected the majority's view that "the Due Process Clause
empowers this Court to nullify any state law if its application 'shocks the conscience,'
offends 'a sense of justice' or runs counter to the 'decencies of civilized conduct.' " Id. at
175. Although he realized that a majority of the Court had refused to apply the Fifth
Amendment to the states, Black maintained that the "stomach pumping" had violated
Rochin's privilege against self-incrimination. See id. Douglas also expressed the view that
capsules taken from a person's stomach, over his objection were "inadmissible because of
the command of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 179. According to him the majority's
approach (which asked whether the police had violated "the decencies of civilized conduct")
made the admissibility of evidence "turn not on the Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies
of the judges who sit here." Id.

110 Id.

at 172.
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This is conduct that shocks the conscience. . . . [T]his course of
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to
offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the
rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation. m
Perhaps because he wanted to put as much distance between Wolf
and Rochin as he could, Justice Frankfurter's nine-page Rochin opinion
"studiously avoided [the search-and-seizure question] and never once
mentioned the Wolf case." 112 If Mapp started out as an obscenity case but
became a search and seizure case along the way, it might be said that
Rochin started out as an "aggravated" search and seizure case but
wound up looking very much like a coerced confessions case:
[The coerced confession cases] are not sports in our constitutional
law but applications of a general principle. They are only instances
of the general requirement that States in their prosecutions respect
certain decencies of civilized conduct. Due process of law [means]
... that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend
"a sense of justice." It would be a stultification of the responsibility
which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to
hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force
what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.
To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call "real
evidence" from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding
coerced confessions. . . . [Coerced confessions] are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in
them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions
offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. So here, to
sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned
by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford
brutality the cloak oflaw.113
Although everybody I have ever talked to about the "stomach
pumping'' case has agreed that the Court should have overturned the
defendant's conviction, it is not easy to reconcile Justice Frankfurter's
majority opinion in Rochin with his majority opinion in Wolf (which may
be why Frankfurter's Rochin opinion never mentions Wolf).
111

Id.

112

Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (principal opinion by Jackson, J.).
Justice Jackson pointed this out in the course of rejecting dissenting Justice Frankfurter's
argument that Rochin applied to the facts of Irvine. Jackson succeeded in arguing that
Rochin did not apply to blatant or egregious illegal searches, but only to cases "involv[ing]
coercion, violence or brutality to the person." Id. See text at notes 133-35 infra.
113

342 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
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The Wolf Court was impressed by the fact that most of the state
courts that had passed on the admissibility of evidence obtained by
unlawful search and seizure had rejected the federal exclusionary rule. 114
But the Rochin Court did not consider it worth mentioning (although
concurring Justice Douglas did) that "[t]he evidence obtained from the
accused's stomach would be admissible in the majority of states where
the question has been raised. " 115
The Wolf Court gave great weight to the fact that the many states
that had rejected the federal exclusionary rule had "not left the right to
privacy without other means of protection" (such as internal police
discipline and tort actions and criminal prosecutions against offending
police officers).11 6 But the Rochin Court thought it irrelevant that the
"stomach pumping" and the earlier physical struggle to retrieve the
capsules from Rochin before he could swallow them constituted more
than one tort and more than one crime.
Indeed, as the Rochin court itself informed us, "the [California]
District Court of Appeal affirmed [Rochin's] conviction, despite the
finding that the officers 'were guilty . . . of unlawfully assaulting and
battering defendant while in [his] room' and 'were guilty of unlawfully
assaulting, battering, torturing, and falsely imprisoning the defendant at
the alleged hospital.' " 117 Moreover, not only did the California courts
make plain that the police officers had committed more than one tort
and more than one crime, but, as the Rochin Court told us, "[a]ll the
California judges who have expressed themselves in this case have
condemned the conduct in the strongest language. " 118
Why, then, would upholding Rochin's conviction have amounted to
"sanctioning" the police misconduct and "affording" it "the cloak of
law"? 119 And if it would have had this effect, why didn't the Supreme
Court's affirmance of Wolf's conviction have the same effect?
In overturning Rochin's conviction, the Court told us that it had
been "brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.' " 120 But
how does this distinguish the Wolf case? The best reading of Wolf (and
the reading that a majority of the Court was soon to give it), 121 is that,
114

See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29.

11 5 Id.

at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring).

116 Id.

at 30.

117

Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166-67.

118

Id. at 174.

119

See text at note 113 supra.

120

Id.

121

See text at notes 105-06 supra.
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although Wolf declined to make the exclusionary rule a limitation on the
states, the police conduct at issue violated Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process. Doesn't every police action that violates due process offend a
sense of justice? (If not, why is it a violation of due process?)
One way to reconcile Rochin with Wolf is to say that although
searches that would have violated the Fourth Amendment if conducted
by federal officers do violate Fourteenth Amendment Due Process when
made by state officers, the use of evidence so acquired in a state
prosecution does not offend due process unless the police methods
involved amount to an egregious or shocking violation of due process.
But this is a curious proposition.
To say that state police conduct is unconstitutional-that it violates
the minimal standards of due process-would seem to be as bad a label
as one can put on police behavior. Why should any more have to be
required? Why must the police be found to have violated sub-minimal
standards before the evidence they obtained has to be excluded? 122
Was the unlawful search in Wolf, unlike the police misconduct in
Rochin, only a "bare" or "mild" violation of due process? How does one
"barely" or "mildly" violate what is "basic to a free society" and
"implicit 'in the concept of ordered liberty' "?123
One might say that the rights the police violated in Wolf were
merely rights "basic to a free society" whereas the rights flouted in
Rochin were rights "very basic to a free society." 124 However, to say the
least, "[t]here is a certain inelegance" in speaking of constitutional
rights that way. 125
4. Irvine v. California
Although Rochin carved out an exception to Wolfs rule of admissibility for evidence obtained by lawless state police, Irvine v. California 126
left no doubt that the exception was quite small. Because the police
misconduct was so egregious-even the Justices who voted to uphold the
defendant's convictions conceded that what the police had done "would
be almost incredible if it were not admitted" 127-Irvine was an excellent
122

See the discussion in Kamisar, supra note 43, at 1121-29.

123 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusions by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause."
124

See Allen, supra note 15, at 9.

125

See id.
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347 U.S. 128 (1954).

127

Id. at 132.
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case to test the limits of Wolfs rule of admissibility. The Court's answer
was clear: The latitude Wolf had given state courts to admit illegally
seized evidence was far-reaching. (To put it another way, there might be
a "shock the conscience" exception to Wolf, but what shocked the
Court's conscience? According to Irvine, "not very much.") 128
In Irvine, in order to overhear conversations between defendant (a
suspected bookmaker) and his wife, the police made repeated illegal
entries into his home, first to install a secret microphone in the hall,
then to move it to the bedroom, and finally to move it to a closet. The
electronic surveillance lasted for over a month. Officers were posted in a
nearby garage to listen. 129
Justice Jackson, who wrote the principal opinion, 130 did not spare the
police:
That officers of the law would break and enter a home, secrete a
[microphone], even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation for
over a month would be almost incredible if it were not admitted.
Few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle
declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on the Federal
Government .... 131
Nevertheless, the Court, per Justice Jackson, rejected the efforts to
bring Irvine "under the sway" of Rochin: 1:12 The key to Rochin, maintained Jackson, was "coercion ... applied by a physical assault upon
[defendant's] person to compel submission to the use of a stomach
pump." 1:i3 That factor was "totally lacking here."rn4 However egregious
128

Dale W. Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolfv. Colorado, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 185, 191

(1961).
129

See 34 7 U.S. at 132.

130 Justice Jackson was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Reed and Minton.
The fifth vote was provided by Justice Clark, who concurred in the judgment.

Clark had no love for Wolf (he stated at the outset of his concurrence that he would
have applied the exclusionary rule to the states if he had been in the Court when Wolf was
decided), but he had no love for Rochin either (id. at 138):
Of course, we could sterilize the rule announced in Wolf by adopting a case-by-case
approach to due process, in which inchoate notions of propriety concerning local police
conduct guide our decisions. But . . . the practical result of this ad hoc approach is
simply that when five Justices are sufficiently revolted by local police action, a
conviction is overturned and a guilty man may go free. Rochin bears witness to this.
131 Id.
132

Id. at 133.

133 Id.

134

at 132.

Id.
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the facts in Irvine, "they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality to
the person. " 135
Dissenting Justice Frankfurter insisted that Rochin called for the
exclusion of the evidence at issue in Irvine. According to Frankfurter,
the decisive factor in Irvine was the "aggravating" police conduct
"which the Court finds repulsive." 136 Frankfurter continued:
There was lacking here physical violence, even to the restricted
extent employed in Rochin. We have here, however, a more powerful
and offensive control over the Irvines' life than a single, limited
physical trespass. Certainly the conduct here went far beyond a bare
search and seizure. . . . Surely the Court does not propose to announce a new absolute, namely that even the most reprehensible
means for securing a conviction will not taint a verdict so long as
the body of the accused was not touched by State officials. 137
For what it is worth, I agree with Justice Frankfurter. Indeedbecause the police misconduct in Irvine lasted for over a month-I, for
one, find it more "outrageous" and more "shocking" than the police
misconduct in Rochin. (Perhaps this just illustrates the unmanageable,
unprincipled nature of the Rochin "shock the conscience" test.)
Although I think Justice Frankfurter's reading of Rochin was better
than Jackson's, the latter's reading was at least plausible. Although
Frankfurter gave no indication he was aware of this, his opinion in Wolf
had come back to haunt him in Irvine. At times it was hard to believe
that the same Justice who dissented in Irvine had written the opinion of
the Court in Wolf.
Although Justice Frankfurter had emphasized in Wolf that the
exclusion of the illegally seized evidence was not the only way to enforce
the security of one's privacy against lawless intrusions by the police, he
protested in Irvine:
Nor can we dispose of this case by satisfying ourselves that the
defendant's guilt was proven by trustworthy evidence and then
finding, or devising, other means whereby the police may be discouraged from using illegal methods to acquire such evidence. 138
But isn't this the way the Court disposed of the Wolf case?
In Irvine, dissenting Justice Frankfurter maintained that not even
suspending or dismissing or prosecuting the law enforcement officials
135

Id.

136 Id.

at 146.

137 Id.

at 145-46.

138

Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
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responsible for the invasion of the Irvines' privacy could justify the use
of the resulting evidence in a state prosecution:
If, as in Rochin, "[o]n the facts of this case the conviction of the
petitioner has been obtained by methods that offend the Due Process Clause," it is no answer to say that the offending policemen and
prosecutors who utilize outrageous methods should be punished for
their misconduct. 139
But why was it an answer to say that in Wolf? Wasn't Wolf's
conviction, no less than Irvine's, brought about by police methods that
offended due process? Why was the availability (or at least possibility) of
alternative ways of enforcing the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure so important in Wolf but so insignificant (indeed, according
to Frankfurter, irrelevant) in Iruine? 140
Unlike his dissenting colleague, Justice Jackson thought it was a
good answer to say that the offending police officers whose "almost
incredible" conduct brought about Irvine's conviction should be punished. It appeared that the California police had committed a federal
crime, i.e., "under color" oflaw, they had deprived the Irvines of "rights,
privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution of the
United States." 141 Therefore, announced Justice Jackson, he was directing "the Clerk of this Court . . . to forward a copy of the record in this
case, together with a copy of this opinion, for attention of the Attorney
General of the United States." 142
Only the newest member of the Court, Chief Justice Warren, shared
Justice Jackson's view that the case should be sent to the Attorney
General for possible prosecution.14 3 Would Jackson have picked up War139 Id.

(emphasis added).

140 One who supported Frankfurter's position might say courts are content to rely on
alternatives to the exclusionary rule when the police violations of due process are
"ordinary" or "routine," but not when they are flagrant and deliberate. In these latter
cases, and Rochin and Irvine are good examples, the courts must exclude the evidence to
show their strong disapproval; alternative remedies simply will not suffice.

It strikes me, however, that the egregiousness of the police misconduct cuts the other
way. The need to exclude the evidence is greater in ordinary or routine cases of police
misconduct because the alternatives to excluding the evidence are much less likely to be
effective. "Routine" or "ordinary" cases of police lawlessness are less likely to attract the
attention of the press, less likely to lead to discipline of or prosecutions against the
offending officers and less likely to excite the sympathy of jurors when those mistreated by
the police seek damages. In short, if the courts cannot rely on alternatives to the
exclusionary rule in outrageous cases such as Rochin and Irvine, then they certainly cannot
and should not rely on such alternatives in less flagrant cases.
1H

See id. at 137-38.

142

Id. at 138.

143

See id. at 137.
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ren's vote if he had not taken this step? We shall probably never know.
But we do know that Jackson's move backfired.

It turned out that the police officers who had concealed the microphone in the Irvines' home had been acting under the order of the local
chief of police and with the full knowledge of the local prosecutor.
Therefore, concluded the Justice Department, "it would be both useless
and inadvisable to present [the] matter to the Federal grand jury." 144
All the Justices who sat on the Mapp Court probably knew that the
pursuit of alternatives to the exclusionary rule in Irvine, one of the most
outrageous cases of police behavior ever to reach the Supreme Court,
had ended with a whimper. Chief Justice Warren certainly knew about
it. The Justice Department official who had concluded that there was no
point prosecuting the police involved in Irvine had been one of Warren's
former deputies and remained one of his closest friends.14 5
According to one of his biographers, later in his career Warren
repeatedly told the story of the Irvine case. 146 One of the lessons he drew
from that case and its aftermath was that the Court could not rely on
alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule. 147
Two years before Mapp was handed down, I wrote:
[F]or better or worse, [the Wolf] doctrine seems more firmly imbedded in the law today than when first promulgated. For on its facts,
Irvine goes much further. Yet, while Irvine well illustrates "the
tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limits of its logic,"
there is also precedent for the view that a principle is never so
vulnerable as when it is so expanded. 148
In retrospect, "the demonstrated incapacity of the Wolf doctrine to
meet the problem of the egregious wrong must be regarded as an
important milestone on the road to Mapp." 149
W See Comment, State Police, Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence and Section 242
of the Civil Rights Statute, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 76, 94 note 75 (1954).

145 See Cray, supra note 27, at 181, 270-71; JOHN D. WEAVER, WARREN THE MAN, THE
COURT, THE ERA 196, 198 (1967). The Justice official was Warren Olney, III, the assistant
attorney general in charge of the criminal division.
146 See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 266 (1982).
117 See id. See also Cray, supra note 27, at 374.
148 Kamisar, supra note 43, at 1198. The quotation about the tendency of a principle to
expand is from BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1925).
149 Allen, supra note 15, at 10.
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5. People v. Cahan

Although it was only a state supreme case, People v. Cahan 150 (which
saw California adopt the exclusionary rule on its own initiative) may be
viewed as another milestone on the road to Mapp. In Defore, Cardozo
had warned that the exclusionary rule could free a dangerous criminal
simply because the constable had blundered. 151 But Cahan illustrated (as
had Irvine only a year earlier) that the rule of admissibility could permit
the use of evidence obtained by the most flagrant and deliberate police
misconduct.
As one contemporary observer said of the police conduct involved in
Cahan: The police illegality in this case "is illegality elaborately planned
with the connivance of the Los Angeles Chief of Police. It is not the case
of the over-eager rookie misjudging the fine lines of the law of arrest. It
is constitutional violation as a matter of policy." 152
"Cardozo's statements [in Defore] and his prestige have often been
relied upon by opponents of the [exclusionary] rule." 15:i
This is hardly surprising. After all, Cardozo was undoubtedly the
most respected state judge of his generation. But Roger Traynor, author
of the Cahan opinion, was widely regarded as the most respected state
judge of his generation. 154 Moreover, when it came to the exclusionary
rule, Traynor had a special credibility. In 1942, when he was a new
judge, he had written the opinion of the California Supreme Court
reaffirming the admissibility of illegally-seized evidence. 155 By 1955,
however, it had become apparent to Traynor, as he later explained, that
illegally seized evidence "was being offered and admitted as a routine
procedure" and it had become "impossible to ignore the corollary that
150

44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).

151

See note 54 supra.

152

Monrad G. Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 65, 75-76 (1957). In Cahan, Los Angeles police officers, with the approval of their
chief of police, had surreptitiously installed microphones in two houses occupied by some of
the defendants. Then, after making forcible entries into the houses, the police had made
various warrantless arrests, searches and seizures. The California Supreme Court called
the police action a "flagrant violation" of both the federal and state constitutions. See 44
Cal. 2d at 436, 282 P.2d at 906.
153 Weinstein,

supra note 43 at 155-56.

154

See Powe, supra note 11, at 199; Walter V. Schaefer, Chief Justice Traynor and the
Judicial Process, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 11, 24 (1965).
155 People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942). Ironically, Earl Warren was
the California Attorney General who had successfully urged Traynor and his colleagues to
take this position.

YALE KAMISAR

75

illegal searches and seizures were also a routine procedure, subject to no
effective deterrent.' ' 156
Justice Traynor wrote a balanced, scholarly opinion. Indeed, the
arguments of scholars and judges in favor of admitting illegally seized
evidence "have seldom been stated more forcefully" than in the Cahan
opinion. 157 But his opinion was also quite powerful:
[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or other discipline, law enforcement officers, sworn to support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of California, frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant acts in violation of both Constitutions and the laws
enacted therein. It is clearly apparent from their testimony that
they casually regard such acts as nothing more than the performance of their ordinary duties for which the City employs and pays
them.

***
We have been compelled to [overrule our precedents permitting the
use of illegally seized evidence] because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions
on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the
courts under the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law-enforcement officers. H;R
In Elkins, 159 decided only a year before Mapp, the Court noted that
"[t]he experience in California has been most illuminating," 160 and
proceeded to quote thirteen lines from Justice Traynor's Cahan opinion.
(It also quoted, not approvingly, one sentence from Cardozo's opinion in
Defore, the only other state case quoted in Elkins.) 161
156 Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L.J. 319,
321-22.
15 7 Monrad G. Paulsen, Criminal Law Administration: The Zero Hour Was Coming, 53
Calif.L.Rev. 103, 107 (1965). Paulsen considered the Cahan opinion "a great achievement"
because "[a]ll voices are heard and we are told why Reason chooses to follow one set of
arguments rather than another." Id.
158 282 P.2d at 907, 911-12. As the quotation from the opinion in the text indicates,
Justice Traynor was a proponent of the "one-government" approach to the admission of
illegally seized evidence. See also id. at 912-13.
159

See text at notes 100-05 supra and accompanying footnotes.

160

364 U.S. at 220.

161

The Mapp Court thought it "significant" that California is "now following [the]
exclusionary rule," 367 U.S. at 651, and noted that its highest court had declared in Cahan
that it had been "compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have
completely failed ... " Id. At another point, the Mapp Court observed that "(t]he experi-
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The Elkins Court quoted something else, something that may have
influenced some members of the Supreme Court as much, or even more
than, the Cahan opinion itself-a statement by the California Attorney
General that since Cahan was decided things were working out well:
The over-all effects of the Cahan decision, particularly in view of the
[search and seizure] rules now worked out by the [California]
Supreme Court, have been excellent. A much greater education is
called for on the part of all peace officers of California. As a result,
they will be much better police officers. I think there is more
cooperation with the District Attorneys and this will make for better
administration of criminal justice. 162

The Police-Prosecution Criticism of Mapp
The reaction of law enforcement officials when the Court finally
imposed the exclusionary rule on all the states may well be the best
evidence of the need for the rule. Many in law enforcement reacted as if
the Fourth Amendment or its state constitutional counterpart had just
been adopted.
New York City Police Commissioner Michael Murphy likened the
Mapp case to a "tidal wave" and an "earthquake." 163 As the commissioner recalled some years later:
I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law
enforcement which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as
[Mapp] . . . . As the then commissioner of the largest police force in
this country, I was immediately caught up in the entire problem of
reevaluating our procedures, which had followed the Defore rule,
and ... creating new polices and new restrictions for the implementation of Mapp .... [Decisions such as Mapp] create tidal waves and
earthquakes which require rebuilding of our institutions sometimes
from their very foundations upward. Retraining sessions had to be
ence of California that ... other remedies [than the exclusionary rule] have been worthless
and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States." Id. at 652. (Once again, Defore
was the only other state case bearing on the exclusionary rule quoted by the Court.)
162 Id. at 220-21. The Court was quoting a letter from then Attorney General Edmund
G. Brown to the Stanford Law Review, quoted in part in Note, Stan. L. Rev. 515, 538
(1957). For other extracts from this letter see Kamisar, supra note 43, at 1198.

Chief Justice Warren must have been impressed by both Justice Traynor's opinion in
Cahan and the state attorney general's assessment of how the police were adjusting to it.
Warren knew Traynor personally and, on the basis of his own dealings with him, respected
him. See Weaver, supra note 144, at 74. As for the state attorney general's optimistic
evaluation of how the police were adjusting to Cahan, this probably corroborated the Chief
Justice's view that rulings criticized for "handcuffing the police" actually encouraged the
police to work harder and to prepare their cases more carefully and thoroughly. See White,
supra note 145, at 272, 277-78.
163

See the quotation from Commissioner Michael Murphy set forth immediately below.
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held from the very top administrators down to each of the thousands
of foot patrolmen and detectives engaged in the daily basic enforcement function. 164
Why did Mapp have "such a dramatic and traumatic effect"? Why
did it necessitate "retraining" from top to bottom? What was the old
search and seizure training like? Was there any? How does one "implement" Mapp, a case that simply imposed a remedy for a violation of a
body of law the police were supposed to be obeying all along?
What did the commissioner mean when he tried to defend his
department's disinterest in the law of search and seizure prior to Mapp
by noting that his department "had followed the Defore rule"? To be
sure, Defore permitted New York prosecutors to use illegally seized
evidence, but it did not-as the commissioner evidently believed-allow
the police to commit illegal searches.
As Donald Dripps has observed, "[i]f effective civil remedies carried
the political appeal that would commend them to legislators, those
remedies would have forced the police to comply with the Amendment in
the [years before] Mapp [and] Mapp would have discomfited the police
but little." 163
It appears that, prior to Mapp, the police were not the only New
York law enforcement officials unfamiliar with and unconcerned about
the law of search and seizure. Professor Richard Uviller, a New York
prosecuting attorney when Mapp was handed down, recalled that he
quickly "cranked out a crude summary" of federal search and seizure
law just before the next state convention of district attorneys took place
and that he "had an instant runaway best seller. It was as though we
had made a belated discovery that the fourth amendment applied in the
State of New York." 166 Uviller's last comment, I believe, sums up the
situation in New York before and after Mapp quite well.
164 Michael Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The
Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 939, 941 (1966).

Those who believed or assumed that various alternatives to the search and seizure
exclusionary rule were adequate may have suffered an even greater blow when, unaware
that there was a reporter in the audience, New York City Deputy Police Commissioner
Leonard Reisman explained to a large group of detectives at a post-Mapp training session
why they had to learn the law of search and seizure at this late date in their careers: "[In
the past] nobody bothered to take out search warrants .... [T]he Supreme Court had ruled
that evidence obtained without a warrant-illegally if you will-was admissible in state
courts. So the feeling was, why bother?" Sidney Zion, Detectives Get a Course in Law, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 28, 1965, at 50, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
165 Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I
Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1559, 1606 (1996).
166 H. Richard Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some
Constitutional Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1982).

MAPP v. OHIO

78

The response of New York law enforcement officials to the imposition of the search and seizure exclusionary rule was hardly unique.
When, six years earlier, in the Cahan case, the California Supreme Court
adopted the exclusionary rule on its own initiative, the reaction of the
Los Angeles Chief of Police, William Parker, was quite similar to the
reaction his New York City counterpart would have when Mapp came
down.
Chief Parker warned that as a result of Cahan his officers' "ability
to prevent the commission of crimes has been greatly reduced." 167 But he
promised that "[a]s long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law of California, your police will respect it and operate to the best of their ability
within the framework of limitations imposed by that rule." 168
However, the Exclusionary Rule does not impose any limitations on
the police; the law of search and seizure does. And Chief Parker seemed
to be saying that his officers would work within the "framework of
limitations" imposed by the law of search and seizure only so long as
"the Exclusionary Rule is the law of California."
In Pennsylvania, a young Philadelphia assistant district attorney
(and a future U.S. Senator), Arlen Specter, made it clear that in his
state, too, tort remedies, criminal prosecutions and internal police discipline had had little or no effect. He announced that Mapp had "revolutionized" police practice and prosecution procedures in the many states
that had been admitting illegally seized evidence. 169 Indeed, he went so
far as to call Mapp "the most significant event in criminal law since the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment." 170
Mr. Specter, too, seemed to confuse the content of the law of search
and seizure (which proponents of the exclusionary rule need not, and
have not always, defended) with the exclusionary rule--a remedy, a rule
that "merely states the consequences of a breach of whatever principles
might be adopted to control law enforcement officers." 171
167

WILLIAM H. PARKER, PARKER ON POLICE 117 (O.W. Wilson ed. 1957).

168

Id. at 131.

169 Arlen Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 4 (1962) (emphasis added). AB the New York City Police Commissioner had done, one
Pennsylvania judge likened Mapp to a natural disaster-a "hurricane" which "swept over
our fair land last June." Id. at 4. Another Pennsylvania judge "was so surprised by the
Mapp holding that he said it applied only to Ohio so far as he was concerned until the
Pennsylvania appellate courts told him otherwise." Id. at 4-5.
110

Id. at 4.

171 Mourad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology & Police Sci. 255 (1961) (written on the eve of Mapp).
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In Minnesota, however, the pattern of law enforcement responses to
imposition of the exclusionary rule was broken. Another future U.S.
Senator, and a future Vice President as well, Minnesota's young Attorney General, Walter Mondale, reminded an assemblage of distressed
Minnesota officers that "the language of the Fourth Amendment is
identical to the [search and seizure provision] of the Minnesota State
Constitution" and that "Mapp did not alter one word of either the state
or national constitutions. " 172 Continued Mondale:
[Mapp] does not reduce police powers one iota. It only reduces
potential abuses of power. The adoption of the so-called "exclusionary rule" does not affect authorized police practices in any way.
What was a legal arrest before, still is. What was a reasonable search
before still is .... m
What Mondale said, in effect, was that if the police feared that the
evidence they were acquiring in their customary manner would now be
excluded by the courts, they must have been unmindful of the so-called
alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule all these years and they
must have been violating the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure all along. That, I think, is the hard truth.

The "Original Understanding" of Mapp
A number of commentators have had great difficulty figuring out
exactly what Justice Clark's rationale(s) for Mapp were. Thus, Thomas
Schrock and Robert Welsh call Clark's statement that the exclusionary
rule is "a clear, specific, and constitutionally required-even if judicially
implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth
Amendment would have been reduced to a form of words" 174 an "incorrigibly ambiguous" passage, "mixing in about equal portions vague constitutional references, deterrence rationale, and empirical generalization. "175 Larry Yackle similarly observes that Mapp "ultimately fastened
the exclusionary rule on the states in reliance upon all the rationales
thus far imposed." 176
172 Walter Mondale, The Problem of Search and Seizure, 19 Bench & B. Minn. 15, 16
(Feb. 1962).
173

Id.

174

367 U.S. at 648.

175

Schrock & Welsh, supra note 66, at 319, quoting 367 U.S. at 648.

176 Yackle, supra note 66, at 418. Professor Yackle continues, id. at 418-19: "Thus the
Court said that the exclusionary rule is 'an essential part' of the individual's personal
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments [367 U.S. at 657], that it gives to the
courts 'that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice' [id. at 660],
and also that its purpose 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it' [id. at 656]."
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William Mertens and Silas Wasserstrom are also unhappy with
Justice Clark's treatment of the exclusionary rule in Mapp. They do not
think Mapp did what it should have-mark a return to the days when
the Court "perceived a kirid of natural, immutable affinity between the
fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule" :177
[A]lthough the Court in Mapp invoked a concatenation of normative
principles to support the extension of the exclusionary rule to the
states, the bulk of its opinion was devoted to a defense of the rule on
the empirical basis that it has proved to be the only effective means
of enforcing the fourth amendment. 178
I have to disagree. The only discussion of the inadequacy of "other
means" of enforcing the right to privacy appears in Part II of Clark's
opinion where he yielded, as have others, to the temptation to meet the
author of the Wolf opinion on the latter's own battleground. However, all
that Clark had to say in his opinion about "other remedies" is contained
in sixteen lines. 179 So few lines in an eighteen page opinion does not seem
to warrant the conclusion that "the bulk" of Clark's opinion was devoted
to a defense of the exclusionary rule on an empirical basis.
Of course, it is not simply a matter of counting lines. Rather, it is a
matter of reading those lines in light of the totality of the opinion. A
quick look at the opinion follows:
• Part I of the Mapp opinion makes plain that it views the exclusionary rule as neither "a mere rule of evidence" or a product of the Court's
"supervisory powers," but as a "constitutionally required" doctrine .180
• Part II tells us that the Wolf Court's reasons for not considering
the exclusionary rule "essential to the right of privacy" "were bottomed
on factual considerations." 181 "[W]hile not basically relevant to the constitutional consideration"182-these factual matters "could not, in any analysis, now be deemed controlling. " 183
• Part III concludes: "We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizure in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court." 184
177

Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 74, at 381.

178 Id.

at 382.

179

See 367 U.S. at 651-53.

180

See id. at 646-50 (emphasis added).

181

Id. at 655 (emphasis added).

182

Id. at 650-51.

183 Id.
184

Id.

at 653 (emphasis added).
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• The main thrust of Part IV is that "[s]ince the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States," "it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government." 185 "[I]n extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the right to
privacy- be also insisted upon as an essential element of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf case. " 186
The Wolf case had downgraded the protection against unreasonable
search and seizure by "conditioning" its "enforcement" in a way that no
other basic constitutional right's enforcement had been restricted. 187 But
from this point on, those days are over. The Fourth Amendment is going
to be enforced as "strictly against the States" as are other fundamental
rights-such as ''the right not to be convicted by use of a coerced
confession, however logically relevant it be, and without regard to its
reliability." 188 This part of the opinion ends with the assurance that "no
man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence." 189
• The fifth and last part of the Clark opinion begins by referring to
"our holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." 190 It ends with the observation
that "[b]ecause [the Fourth Amendment] is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process
Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who ... chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision ...
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him .... " 191
I do not deny that Justice Clark scrambled the analysis somewhat
and caused some confusion by, for example, calling the exclusionary rule
"a constitutionally required ... deterrent safeguard." 192 The trouble, I
believe, was that Justice Clark was trying to get maximum approval for
the overruling of Wolf. Evidently he thought he could do so by advancing
as many reasons (or arguments) for the exclusionary rule he could find.
185

Id. at 655.

186

Id. at 656 (emphasis added).

1s1 Id.

at 656.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 657 (emphasis added).

1911

Id. (emphasis added).

191

Id. (emphasis added).

192

See text at note 174 supra.
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Evidently Clark also thought he could do so by refuting all the arguments the rule's critics had ever made. (One of those, of course, was the
claim that the exclusionary rule was not an effective deterrent or that it
was not any better than "other methods" of enforcing the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure.)
I agree with Steven Schlesinger and Bradford Wilson:
It is true that Justice Clark discussed deterrence and concluded that
"other remedies ... have been worthless and futile." ... Yet it is
clear that he was only trying to counter Wolfs claim that the
exclusionary rule was bad law from a policy standpoint. The only
reason Justice Clark engaged in that factual discussion was that he
read Wolf to be "bottomed on factual considerations" [367 U.S. at
651) as opposed to constitutional analysis or deduction, and out of
respect for the precedent he was overturning, he felt obliged to meet
and defeat it on its own grounds first, before moving to the basis of
his own position. 193
It may well be that the Justices who voted to overrule Wolf were
heavily influenced by the belief that all the alternatives to the exclusionary rule had turned out to be woefully inadequate. But that is not the
way Clark's opinion is written. The way it is written, the exclusionary
rule does not rest on an empirical proposition. 194 Rather, it is a command
of the Constitution.
As I noted earlier, a number of commentators have read Mapp
differently than I do. But they did so many years after Mapp was handed
down. I cannot help wondering whether they were operating under what
in this instance might be called the handicap of hindsight. They were
looking back on the landmark search and seizure case through the filter
of subsequent cases that have downgraded the exclusionary rule and
misread or distorted Clark's opinion in Mapp. 195
Professor Francis Allen, who wrote a major article on the Mapp case
the year it was decided, seemed to have little trouble understanding the
basic reasoning of the Clark opinion. Although the opinion "does not
confine itself to the statement of a 'syllogism,' " Justice Clark's "essen193 Stev.en R. Schlesinger & Bradford Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: The
Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 Duquesne L. Rev. 225, 235-36 (1980).
Immediately after observing that Wolfs rejection of the Weeks doctrine was "bottomed on
factual considerations," 367 U.S. at 651, Clark said his opinion was going to consider "the
factual grounds upon which Wolf was based" even though these factual considerations "are
not basically relevant to a decision that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of
the Fourth Amendment." Id. A short time later, see id. at 653, Clark made this point
again.
194 Cf
195

Allen, supra note 3, at 537.

See text at notes 200-233 infra.
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tial position," reported Professor Allen, "is that the exclusionary rule is
part of the Fourth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment is part of the
Fourteenth; therefore, the exclusionary rule is part of the Fourteenth. " 196

Post-Warren Court Developments
Concurring in Mapp, Justice Douglas commented that the overruled
Wolf case had evoked "a storm of constitutional controversy which only
today finds its end." 197 He could not have been more wrong. The
controversy was not only to intensify but to engulf the Weeks or federal
exclusionary rule itself. 198
Since Mapp relied to a significant extent on the premise that the
exclusionary rule was an essential part of the Fourth Amendment and
took the position that "in extending the substantive protections of due
process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federalit was logically and constitutionally necessary" to extend the exclusionary rule as well, 199 critics of Mapp soon began directing their fire at the
efficacy, validity and constitutional basis of the Weeks or federal exclusionary rule itself. And they did so with great force and much success.
1. The "Deterrence" Rationale and "Cost-Benefit" Analysis Gain
Ascendancy-and the Thrust of the Exclusionary Rule Narrows
In the post-Warren Court era, the "deterrence" rationale and "costbenefit" analysis came to the fore. 200 This approach bloomed in United
l!l 6 Allen, supra note 15, at 26. See also id. at 23-24. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 153, at
150. Francis Allen wa8 not only a leading commentator on Mapp, but the earliest critic, and
the most redoubtable critic, of Wolf See Allen, supra note 73.

197

367 U.S. at 670.

198 As Telford Taylor has noted, the Court's division in the Mapp case "did not concern
the merits of the [federal or Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule," but only the
application of the rule to the states. "That is the issue on which the justices divided, and
there is not a word in [Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion] suggesting that the rule is
intrinsically bad," TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20-21
(1969).

199

367 U.S. at 655-56.

zoo One might say that the deterrence rationale came to the fore even before the
Warren Court disbanded. Although the case could have been limited to its special facts, the
deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule is the dominant theme in Link.letter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which declined to give Mapp full retroactive effect. The Court
was under tremendous pressure to reach this result because applying the exclusionary rule
announced in Mapp to cases which had become "final" (beyond direct review) before Mapp
was decided "would tax the administration of justice to the utmost." Id. at 637. It is highly
unlikely that in a case prosecuted in a pre-Mapp "admissibility" jurisdiction the defendant
would have dwelt on the illegality of a search or seizure or that the court would even have
allowed him to develop this point. But the understandably strong pressure to limit the
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States v. Calandra, 201 the most important exclusionary rule case of the
1970s. In the course of ruling that grand jury witnesses may not refuse
to answer questions on the ground that the questions were based on the
fruits of an unlawful search, the Calandra Court did not treat the
exclusionary rule with the constitutional respect Mapp had.
The Calandra majority, per Justice Powell, characterized the ruleone might say disparaged it-as a "judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. " 202 Thus, whether the exclusionary rule should be applied "presents a question not of rights but of remedies" -a question to be
answered by weighing the "likely 'costs' " of the rules against the "likely
'benefits.' " 203
impact of Mapp led the Linkletter Court (per Clark, J.) to rest the exclusionary rule almost
entirely on an empirical basis.

As I have observed elsewhere, Kamisar, supra note 56, at 630, 631-32, "[o]ne might
say that Linkletter applied Wolfs way of thinking about the exclusionary rule 'retroactively' to Mapp. . . . [T]he Linkletter Court strongly implied . . . that the exclusionary rule is
'an essential ingredient' of the fourth amendment only because, and only so long as, it is
'the only effective deterrent to lawless police action' " (quoting 381 U.S. at 636-37). See
generally Kamisar, supra, at 627-33 and the authorities quoted and cited therein.
Despite their popularity in judicial opinions and the legal literature, the terms
"deterrence" or "deterrent effects" in the search and seizure context are quite misleading.
"Deterrence" suggests that the exclusionary rule is supposed to influence the police the
way the criminal law is supposed to affect the general public. But the rule does not, and
cannot be expected to, "deter" the police the way the criminal law is supposed to work.
The rule does not inflict a "punishment" on police who violate the Fourth Amendment;
exclusion does not leave the police in a worse position than if they had never violated the
Constitution in the first place.
However, because the police are members of a structural governmental entity, the rule
influences them, or is supposed to influence them, by "systemic deterrence," i.e., through a
department's institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment standards. See Wayne R.
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
"Good Faith," 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 319-20, 350-51 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom,
supra note 74, at 394, 399; Pierre Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith
Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. Crim. L. Criminology & P.S. 875, 882-83; Yackle,
supra note 66, at 426.
Despite the widespread use of the "deterrence" terminology, it seems more accurate to
view the exclusionary rule as a "disincentive" or "counterweight"-a means of eliminating
significant incentives for making illegal searches, at least where the police contemplate
prosecution and conviction. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 431 (1974).
201

414 U.S. 338 (1974).

202

Jd. at 348.

203

Id. at 348, 354, 349.
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The post-Mapp way of thinking about the exclusionary rule enabled
critics of the rule to gain some important victories. This is hardly
surprising. The "costs" of the exclusionary rule are immediately apparent-the "freeing," for example, of a drug dealer-but the "benefits" of
the rule are hard to grasp.
One could say that the benefits ''involve safeguarding a zone of
dignity and privacy for every citizen, controlling abuses of power [and]
preserving checks and balances." 204 And one could regard these goals as
"pretty weighty benefits, perhaps even invaluable ones." 205 But the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have not done so. Instead, they have
characterized the benefits of the rule "as abstract [and] speculative." 206
On the other hand, the Court has underscored what it thinks are the
severe costs of the rule. 207 Thus, it has called the rule a "drastic
204 Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law
Enforcement, 66 Wash. U. L.Q. 11, 19 (1988).
205

Id.

206

Id.

207 However, a five-year empirical study of California data by Thomas Davies, called
"[t]he most careful and balanced assessment conducted to date of all available empirical
data," 1 WAYNER. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT 58 (3d
ed. 1996), reveals that the exclusion of evidence in murder, rape, and other violent cases is
extremely rare. Sec Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to
Learn) About the Costs of the Exclusionary Rule, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 611, 640, 645.
"The most striking feature of the data," reports Professor Davies, "is the concentration of
illegal searches in drug arrests (and possibly weapons possession arrests) and the extremely
small effects in arrests for other offenses, including violent crimes." Id. at 680.

The California data reveals that less than 0.3% (fewer than three in 1,000) of arrests
for all non-drug offenses are rejected by prosecutors because of illegal searches. Id. at 619.
Davies estimates that "the cumulative loss of drug arrests at all stages of felony processing
in California is around 7.1%." Id. at 681. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 note
6 (1984), the Court, per Justice White, estimated that "the cumulative loss due to
nonprosecution or nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably
in the range of2.8% to 7.1%."
One may argue, as the Court did in Leon, that the small percentage of cases lost "mask
a large absolute number." Id. As Davies points out, however, "raw numbers are not as
useful for policy evaluation as percentages. In a system as large as the American criminal
justice system . . . almost any nationwide measurement or estimate will look larger if
expressed in raw numbers" Davies, supra at 670.
A proponent of the exclusionary rule could hardly resist the temptation to ask: What is
all this talk about the "costs" of the exclusionary rule? Are the costs any different than
those that would be exacted by any equally effective remedy? Doesn't a society whose police
comply with the Fourth Amendment in the first place (because of an effective tort remedy or
internal discipline or some other reason) "pay the same price" as the society whose law
enforcement officials cannot use the evidence they obtained because they violated the
Fourth Amendment? Don't both societies convict fewer criminals?

MAPP v. OHIO

86

measure," 208 an "extreme sanction," 209 a rule that "exacts a costly toll
upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case,"210
and one whose application is "contrary to the idea of proportionality that
is essential to the concept of justice. " 211
Given the Court's characterization of the "costs" and "benefits" to
be balanced, the outcome is quite predictable. Indeed, although costbenefit analysis sounds objective, even scientific, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that in search-and-seizure cases, at least, it simply gives back
the values and assumptions the Court feeds into it.
During the cost-benefit analysis era, the Court failed to apply the
exclusionary rule to various settings. In the aforementioned Calandra
case, it declined to apply the rule in grand jury proceedings. In Stone v.
Powell, 212 it greatly limited the circumstances under which search-andseizure claims could be raised on federal habeas corpus proceedings. In
United States v. Janis, 213 it found the rule inapplicable in federal civil tax
proceedings. And in l.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 214 the Court deemed the
rule inappropriate in civil deportation proceedings.
The cost-benefit approach to the exclusionary rule culminated in
United States v. Leon, 215 the case that adopted a so-called good-faith
exception (actually a "reasonable mistake" exception) to the exclusionary rule. As the Leon majority saw it, the "marginal or nonexistent
benefits" produced by the exclusionary rule when the police reasonably
but mistakenly rely on a search warrant that turns out to be invalid
'' cannot justify the costs of exclusion.' ' 216
Although Leon may appear to be little more than a routine application of the "cost-benefit" approach utilized in earlier cases, such as
Calandra, it is not. The earlier cases were based on the assumption that
the exclusionary rule-fully applicable in a criminal prosecution against
the direct victim of an illegal search or seizure-need not also be applied
208

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976).

209

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).

2 rnunited

States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,734 (1980).

211

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 (1976).

212

See note 211 supra.

213 See

note 208 supra.

214

468 U.S. 1032 (1984).

215

468 U.S. 897 (1984).

216

Id. at 922.
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in certain "collateral" or "peripheral" contexts "where no significant
additional increment of deterrence [was] deemed likely. " 217
Until Leon was handed down, one could still say that the postWarren Court's "deconstitutionalization" of the exclusionary rule-its
view that the rule is only a "judicially created" remedial device whose
application turns on a "pragmatic analysis of [its] usefulness in a
particular context" 218-had not affected the rule in its central application: the prosecutor's case-in-chief against the direct victim of an unreasonable search and seizure. But Leon made clear that here, too, the rule
would be subjected to "interest-balancing" or "cost-benefit" analysis. In
this setting, too, the Court would ask whether the rule could "pay its
way."
The fact that the Court carved out an exception to the exclusionary
rule in its central application and the cost-benefit balancing it used to
reach that result renders the exclusionary rule almost defenseless
against "legislative repeal," for example, legislation that offers in its
place what its proponents will undoubtedly assure us is an "effective"
tort remedy. As Justice Brennan, who dissented in Leon, observed:
By remaining within the redoubt of empiricism and by basing the
rule solely on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the
rule of legitimacy. A doctrine that is explained as if it were an
empirical proposition but for which there is only limited empirical
support is both inherently unstable and an easy mark for critics ....
Rather than seeking to give effect to the liberties secured by the
Fourth Amendment through guesswork about deterrence, the Court
should restore to its proper place the principle framed . . . in Weeks
that an individual whose privacy has been invaded in violation of the
Fourth Amendment has a right grounded in that Amendment to
prevent the government from subsequently making use of any
evidence so obtained. 219
So far the Court has not applied the "good faith" exception to all
searches; it has confined Leon to those occasions where the police have
acted pursuant to a warrant. 220 However, by applying "Leon-type reason217

1 LaFave, supra note 207, at 56.

218

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 488.

21 9 468

U.S. at 943 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting in Leon and the
companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)).
220 Nevertheless, warns Professor LaFave, "the possibility" that Leon and its companion case "will serve as stepping stones to a more comprehensive good faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be discounted .... Particularly noteworthy is
the Leon majority's broad assertion that whenever the police officer's conduct was
objectively reasonable the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule is not served and
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ing" to instances where the police have relied on legislative and clerical
action or inaction, the Court "has held admissible on 'good faith'
grounds evidence obtained in warrantless police activity." 221
Thus, Illinois u. Krull applied Leon's rationale to a case where the
police had acted in reliance on a state law authorizing the search in
question even though the statute turned out to be in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 222 However, as the four dissenters protested, "[s]tatutes authorizing unreasonable searches were the core concern of the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment." 223 Moreover, whereas a judicial
officer's authorization of a search only "authorizes a single search under
particular circumstances," 224 "a legislature's unreasonable authorization
of searches may affect thousands or millions" and therefore surely
"poses a greater threat to liberty." 225
The Court also applied the reasoning of Leon (and Krull) to the facts
in Arizona u. Euans. 226 Defendant had been taken into custody because a
patrol car's computer indicated he had an outstanding arrest warrant. In
fact, the arrest warrant had been quashed several weeks earlier because
of defendant's voluntary appearance in court. Evidently the court clerk
had not notified the sheriff's department so that the warrant could be
removed from the computer records.
The Court ruled the evidence admissible: "[T]here is no basis for
believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances
will have a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed. " 227 But dissenting
Justice Ginsburg argued that "[w]hether particular records are maintained by the police or the courts should not be dispositive where a single
computer database can answer all calls." 228 Moreover, not only is the
that 'when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants
offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.'" 1 LaFave, supra note 207, at 93,
quoting 468 U.S. at 908 (opinion of the Court by White, J.).
221

1 LaFave, supra note 207, at 93.

222

480 U.S. 340 (1987). The invalid statute had authorized warrantless inspections of
the records of licensed motor vehicles and vehicular parts sellers.
223

Id. at 362 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, J. dissenting).

224

Id. at 365.

225

Id.

22s

514 U.S. 1 (1995).

227

Id. at 15.

228

Id. at 29 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
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distinction between court clerk and police clerk "artificial," in practice it
is difficult to tell which official "caused the error to exist or to persist." 229
As Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott230 illustrates, the Rehnquist Court has also continued to decline to apply the exclusionary rule
to proceedings other than criminal prosecutions. But the reasoning of
the Court leaves a good deal to be desired.
The officers who conducted the warrantless and apparently suspicionless search of Scott's home did so because they thought he might be
keeping firearms there, a violation of one of the conditions of his parole
as well as a crime. The officers knew that Scottt was a parolee. They
themselves were parole officers. If Scott did turn out to possess firearms
(and he did), the officers probably contemplated a revocation proceeding
rather than a criminal prosecution. For, as the Supreme Court observed
some thirty years ago, a parole revocation "is often preferred to a new
prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State. " 231
The Scott majority declined to apply the exclusionary rule, reminding us that the rule need not apply "in every instance in which it might
provide marginal deterrence. " 232 As Justice Souter pointed out for the
dissenters, however, when the searching officers know, as these officers
did, that the subject of their search is a parolee (or probationer), there is
nothing "marginal" or "incremental" about application of the exclusionary rule. For the officers most likely assumed (and correctly so) that the
revocation hearing would be the only proceeding in which the evidence
would ever be offered. 233
2. The Fourth Amendment Is Subjected to a Prolonged Campaign
of "Guerilla Warfare" 234
Narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary rule, that is, restricting
the circumstances in which evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment must be excluded, is only one way to reduce the impact of
Weeks and of Mapp. Another way is to shrink the scope of the Amendment itself, e.g., to dilute what amounts to "probable cause" to arrest or
to search; to take a grudging view of what constitutes a "search" or
"seizure"; and to make it easy to establish "consent" to what otherwise
would be an illegal search. These developments, too, give the police more
229

Id.

230

524 U.S. 357 (1998).

2:l1

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 4 71, 4 79 (1972).

232

Id. at 368.

233

Id. at 374 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
2:34

See text at note 236 infra and accompanying footnote.
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leeway to investigate crime and the defendant fewer opportunities to
invoke the exclusionary rule.
On a few occasions the post-Warren Court did decide some searchand-seizure cases in favor of the defense, 235 but in the main it substantially reduced the impact of the exclusionary rule both by cutting back on
the application of the rule itself and by downsizing the scope of the
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
What Albert Alschuler said of the Burger Court when it came to an
end applies to the Rehnquist Court as well. And Professor Alschuler's
observation applies with special force to the law of search and seizure:
In place of the expected counterrevolution, the Burger Court waged
a prolonged and rather bloody campaign of guerilla warfare. It
typically left the facade of Warren Court decisions standing while it
attacked those decisions from the sides and underneath. 2:i6
A few examples follow:
The heart of the Fourth Amendment is "probable cause." Illinois v.
Gates 237 dismantled the existing probable cause structure2:i8 in favor of a
235 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal
imager or, more generally, any "sense-enhancing" technology to obtain "any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search-at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use"); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (police slaying of an unarmed, nondangerous felon in order to
prevent his escape constitutes an "unreasonable seizure" within meaning of the Fourth
Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (police must be armed with a
warrant before entering a suspect's home to make a routine arrest); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975) (with some exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial
determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint on a
suspect's liberty).
236 Albert Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 Harv.
L.Rev. 1436, 1442 (1987). Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2527-28 (1996)
(not only have the Burger and Rehnquist Courts "promulgat[ed] 'inclusionary rules' that
made possible the admission of evidence that has been obtained through unconstitutional
conduct of law enforcement agents," but by changing rules governing the standard of
review on appeal and on federal habeas corpus it has made it harder for the erroneous
admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence at trial to lead to the overturning of
convictions).

2:i 7 462 U.S. 213 (1983), criticized in Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good
Faith," and Beyond, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 557 (1984); Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment
Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing
Askew), 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1171, 1188-89 (1983); and Silas Wasserstrom, The
Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257, 329-40 (1984).
2:J 8 The existing structure was known as the "two-pronged test," which consisted of the
"veracity" prong and the "basis of knowledge" prong. Concurring in the judgment in
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mushy "totality of the circumstances" test. The Court emphasized that
it viewed "probable cause" as "a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. " 239 The Gates Court made it
fairly clear that "probable cause" is something less than "more probable
than not" (although how much less is anything but clear). At one point
the Court told us that "probable cause requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity." 240
Moreover, because the rulings of magistrates are entitled to considerable deference, the issuing magistrate does not have to be right. It is
enough that the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for believing
probable cause existed. 241 When one combines Gates with Leon, decided a
year later, the result is that "[u]nlawfully seized evidence [becomes]
admissible when a police officer could have reasonably believed that a
magistrate could have reasonably believed that a person could have
reasonably believed that a search would uncover evidence of a crime." 242
Police activity is not subject to any constitutional restraints if the
activity does not amount to a "search" or "seizure." Both the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts have taken a narrow, stingy view of these key
terms.
Consider California v. Greenwood. 243 A garbage bag is a common
repository for personal effects and a search of such bags can reveal
intimate details about one's business dealings, political activities, sexual
practices and personal hygiene. Yet Greenwood held that the police may
tear open the sealed opaque trash bags people place at the curb for
garbage pick-up and examine their contents for evidence of crime without engaging in a "search." 244
Gates, Justice White summed up the two-pronged test as follows: "First, an affidavit based
on an informant's tip, standing alone, cannot provide probable cause for issuance of a
warrant unless the tip includes information that apprises the magistrate of the informant's
basis for concluding that the contraband is where he claims it is (the 'basis of knowledge'
prong) and the affiant informs the magistrate that the informant is credible (the 'veracity'
prong)." Id. at 267.
239

Id. at 232.

240

Id. at 244 note 13 (emphasis added).

241

See id. at 238-39.

242

Alschuler, supra note 236, at 1445. See also Kamisar, supra note 237, at 589.

24:l

486 U.S. 35 (1988).

244 It is unclear to what extent Greenwood is grounded on the notion that one has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in materials one voluntarily turns over to a third person
or to what extent the decision turns on the fact that Mr. Greenwood left his garbage bags
for collection on the curb-outside the curtilage of his home.
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To say that the use of a police investigating technique, e.g., police
examination of a person's garbage or police aerial surveillance of a
fenced-in backyard245 or police use of a pen register2 46 is not a "search" is
a drastic move. For it means the police activity is completely uncontrolled by the Fourth Amendment. On the other hand, to conclude that a
particular investigatory technique is a "search" is not a drastic move.
For such a conclusion does not ban the investigative technique at issue
altogether. 247
The Court has not only taken a cramped view of what constitutes a
"search." It has also given the crucial term "seizure" a narrow reading.
According to Florida v. Bostick, 248 if armed police board an interstate bus
at a scheduled intermediate stop, announce their mission is to detect
drug traffickers, randomly approach a passenger, ask to see his bus
ticket and driver's license, and then ask permission to search his
luggage, no "seizure" has taken place. Under these circumstances, with
two armed officers filling the aisle and towering over him, we are
supposed to believe that a reasonable person would feel free to terminate
the encounter or to ignore the police presence and to return to what he
was doing-for example, go back to reading his newspaper or working on
his crossword puzzle.
Although the post-Warren Court has taken a grudging view of what
amounts to a "search" or "seizure," it has taken a very relaxed view of
what constitutes a consent to an otherwise illegal search or seizure.
"Consent" is law enforcement's trump card. It is the easiest and most
propitious way for the police to avoid the problems presented by the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, the protection afforded by the Amendment
will vary greatly depending on how difficult or easy it is for the police to
establish consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 249 made it all too easy.
If an officer lacks authority to conduct a search, he may request
permission to search, but he cannot demand it. To many people who
confront the police, however, the distinction is very thin-or nonexis245

See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).

24 6 Smith

v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The ruling that the government's use of a
pen register, a device that records all numbers dialed from a given phone and the time they
were dialed, is not a "search" or "seizure" was based on the ground that one who uses a
phone "assumes the risk" the phone company will tell the government the numbers a
person dialed.
247 For example, one might conclude that the examination of the contents of sealed
trash bags is a "search," but that it is not bounded by the same limitations applicable to a
search of one's dwelling. Thus, although classified as a "search," police examination of
sealed trash might not require traditional probable cause.
248

501 U.S. 429 (1991).

249

412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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tent. "[W]hat on their face are merely words of request take on color
from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor." 250
All the police need do to make the distinction between "request"
and "demand" meaningful is to advise a person that she has the right to
refuse an officer's "request" and that such a refusal will be respected.
But the Schneckloth Court dismissed such a requirement as "thoroughly
impractical. " 251 That such a warning would undermine what the Court
called "the legitimate need for [consent] searches" 252 is quite clear; that
such a warning would be "impractical" (as that word is normally
defined) is not at all clear.
Now that Schneckloth is on the books, a person may effectively
consent to a search even though she was never informed-and the
government has failed to demonstrate that she was ever aware-that she
had the right to refuse the officer's "request" to search her person,
automobile, or home. After Schneckloth, the criminal justice system, in
one important respect at least, does (to borrow a phrase from the
Escobedo case) "depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens'
abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. " 253
The Schneckloth approach to consent searches reappeared in Ohio v.
Robinette. 254 After stopping the defendant for speeding, issuing a verbal
warning, and returning his license, Deputy Sheriff Newsome-who has
enjoyed remarkable success in getting motorists to consent to searches of
their cars 255-added "One question before you get gone. Are you carrying
any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapon of any kind, drugs,
anything like that?" 256
When the defendant replied in the negative, the deputy asked
whether he could search the car. The defendant said he could. The
search turned up a small amount of drugs. The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the evidence should have been excluded because the defen250 Caleb Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest 51
J. Crim. L. and Criminology and Police Sci., 402, 403 (1960).
251

412 U.S. at 231.

252

Id. at 227.

253Cf.

254

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,490 (1964).

519 U.S. 33 (1996).

255

Newsome testified that it was his routine practice to ask permission to search a
motorist's car during a traffic stop. When asked in another case why he did so, he replied:
"I need the practice." State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). He
has had a lot of practice. In one year alone he requested, and obtained consent to, a search
incident to a traffic stop more than 750 times. See id. at 503 note 3.
256

Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35-36.
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dant's consent was obtained during an illegal detention (after every
aspect of the traffic stop had been brought to a conclusion) and the drugs
found were a product of that unlawful detention. 257 In order to prevent
the police from turning a routine stop "into a fishing expedition for
unrelated criminal activity," and to assure that the encounter immediately following the completion of the business relating to the traffic stop
would be truly consensual, the Ohio court required the following: When
the police have completed the business of the traffic stop, any attempt to
search a vehicle about an unrelated crime must be preceded by a police
warning: "At this time you are legally free to go" (or words to this
effect). 258
It strikes me that the Ohio Supreme Court made a valiant effort to
deal with a practice that is hard to square with the Fourth Amendment.
However, to almost no one's surprise, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion, thought it
would be "unrealistic" to require police officers to tell motorists detained
for traffic violations that they were "free to go" before asking them
whether they would consent to a search of their cars. 259
Why would it be unrealistic? Keep in mind that Deputy Newsome,
and many other officers as well, routinely ask motorists who have been
stopped for a traffic violation and are about to leave, a series of questions
before asking whether they will consent to a search of their cars. It is
hard to see why advising a once-detained motorist that he is free to leave
is any more time-consuming or burdensome than the technique Newsome and his colleagues use in working their way up to asking a motorist
to consent to a search.
There is also the matter of third-party consent searches. Illinois v.
Rodriguez260 tells us that a warrantless entry of one's home is valid when
the police reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that a third party (in this
case, a girlfriend of defendant who had in fact moved out of his
apartment) possesses common authority over the premises. Thus, even
though (a) no magistrate authorizes the search, (b) no probable cause
supports the search, and (c) no exigency requires quick action, the police
may enter a person's home on the basis of the "seeming consent" of a
third party.
257

State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 69$-99 (Ohio 1995).

25 8 Jd.
259

at 696, quoted in Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36.

See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40.

260 497 U.S. 177 (1990). For extensive criticism of this case, see Thomas Y. Davies,
Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent,
Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police
Error, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1991). See also Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall:
Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 723, 796-99 (1992).
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The Rodriguez dissenters forcefully argued that when confronted
with the choice of either relying on the consent of a third party or
obtaining a warrant, the police "should secure a warrant and must
therefore accept the risk of error should they instead choose to rely on
consent. " 261 But the majority was not impressed. "What [a person] is
assured by the Fourth Amendment," observed Justice Scalia, "is not
that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents;
but that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable' " 262-and a
search is not unreasonable when the police "reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a
resident of the premises." 263
New York Times columnist William Safi.re once said that "a strong
reason must exist for commuters to go into hock to buy a car, to sweat
out traffic jams [and] to groan over repair bills" and the reason is "the
blessed orneriness called privacy." 264 Evidently, the post-Warren Court
does not agree. For in the thirty-five years since Chief Justice Warren
stepped down from the Court, the privacy the Fourth Amendment
affords motorists has greatly diminished.
A goodly number of Supreme Court cases can be cited in support of
this statement. 265 Ironically, the best case may be one where the police
261497 U.S. at 193 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
262

Jd. at 183.

263

Id. at 187.

264 Quoted in Lewis Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the
Warrant Clause, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 557, 571 note 79 (1982). See also the discussion of
how private automobile transportation has shaped American society in David A. Harris,
Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556,
576-78 (1998).

265See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (whether the police have
probable cause to believe that drugs are somewhere in a car and come upon a closed
container that just happens to be there, or whether the probable cause has focused on a
container that just happens to be in the vehicle, the police may make a warrantless search
of the container, even if found in the locked car trunk); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981) (even though police lack any reason to believe that a car contains evidence of crime,
if they have adequate grounds to make a custodial arrest of driver they may make a
warrantless search of the entire interior or passenger compartment of the car, including
closed containers, whether or not the driver has been removed from the car and handcuffed); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (Belton rule, supra, applies even
when an officer does not make contact with the arrestee until he has already left the
vehicle); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (finding of drugs in backseat armrest of
car validly stopped for traffic offense gives police probable cause to believe that front-seat
passenger (and apparently all passengers in car) is guilty of possessing a controlled
substance); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (police may order all passengers, as
well as the driver, out of a lawfully stopped car absent any particularized suspicion that
any occupant of the car is armed or dangerous).
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undeniably had lawful grounds to stop the car. (e.g., there is no question
the police had probable cause to believe that various provisions of the
traffic code, such as speeding and turning without signaling, had been
violated. )266
The Whren defendants conceded they had violated certain provisions
of the local traffic code. But they maintained that, given the enormous
multitude of traffic and vehicular equipment regulations and the ease
with which the police may find anybody violating one or more of them,
allowing mere observation of a minor traffic offense automatically to
justify a stop or arrest gives the police a great temptation to use traffic
enforcement as a means of investigating other more serious violations as
to which no individual suspicion exists. Probable cause as to a minor
traffic violation can be so easily come by, argued the defendants, that its
existence provides no effective protection against arbitrary police action. 261
Therefore, contended the defendants, the Court should adopt a
"would have" test, under which a traffic stop or arrest satisfies the
Fourth Amendment only if a reasonable police officer would have been
motivated to stop the car or arrest the motorist by a desire to enforce the
traffic laws or-to put it another way-police action violates the Fourth
Amendment if a reasonable officer would not have taken the action she
did but for an underlying purpose or motivation that, standing alone,
could not provide a lawful basis for the police action.
Applying this test to the facts of the Whren case would have been
easy. The arresting officers were plainclothes vice squad officers in
unmarked cars, patrolling what they call a "high drug area" of Washington, D.C. 268 District of Columbia police regulations permit plainclothes
officers in unmarked cars to enforce traffic law only when the violation is
"so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others"w'-and
that is a far cry from the violations that occurred in Whren.
266 Whren

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

267

Moreover, there is reason to think that the police use the pretext of traffic
enforcement to harass motorists because of the length of their hair, the style of their
clothing, or the color of their skin. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U.
Miami L. Rev. 425 (1997); David A Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
544 (1997); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts
about Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 Va. U. L. Rev. 243 (1991);
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 Sup.Ct.Rev. 271.
268

Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.

269

Id. at 815 (quoting the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., General

Order).
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But the Court, per Justice Scalia, rejected this approach (and,
surprisingly, without a dissent). It held that a traffic stop or arrest is
permissible so long as an officer in the same circumstances could have
made the stop or arrest (because the officer had observed a traffic
violation) regardless of whether a reasonable officer would have made
the stop or arrest had there not been some reason or motivation beyond
the traffic offense (such as a hunch that the driver or a passenger had
drugs or guns in his possession).
After Whren, a traffic stop supported by adequate grounds to believe
that a violation occurred satisfies the Fourth Amendment whatever the
motives of the police, whatever internal police regulations may have to
say about enforcing the traffic laws and whatever the usual or routine
practice of the police department. In short, after Whren there is no such
thing as a pretextual traffic stop.
As William Stuntz has observed:
In a world where trivial crimes stay on the books, or one where
routine traffic offenses count as crimes, the requirement of probable
cause to arrest may mean almost nothing. Officers can arrest for a
minor offense-everyone violates the traffic rules-in order to
search or question a suspect on a major one. This allows arrests and
searches of suspected drug dealers without any ex ante support for
the suspicion, the very thing the probable cause standard is supposed to forbid. 270
3.

Revising Cardozo's Famous Epigram

More than three-quarters of a century ago, when Cardozo delivered
his memorable one liner about the criminal "go[ing] free because the
constable has blundered," 271 and even in 1961, when the Court imposed
the exclusionary rule on the states as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, the law of search and seizure probably did unduly
restrict the police-on paper. But this is no longer true.
Mapp has had a large impact. Whether or not the Warren Court
intended this result or foresaw it, Mapp and its progeny have greatly
clarified and simplified the law of search and seizure-especially in favor
of the police. Because the thrust of the exclusionary rule and the scope of
the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment have been so narrowed, and the room the police have to maneuver safely so enlarged,
Cardozo's famous epigram is outdated. Nowadays, the criminal rarely, if
ever, "goes free" because the constable has made an honest blunder or a
27° William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 7 (1997). See also Harris, supra note 264, at 559-60.
271

See note 54 supra.
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technical one. If the criminal does go free it is most likely because the
constable has flouted the Fourth Amendment-has blundered badly.

A Final Comment
A critic of Mapp might take all the search-and-seizure cases I have
discussed in the previous section (as well as others I have not) and throw
them back at proponents of the exclusionary rule. These cases demonstrate, she might say, that the rule puts tremendous pressure on the
courts to avoid "freeing a guilty defendant." If Mapp had never imposed
the rule on the states, she might argue, the Fourth Amendment would
never have been construed as narrowly as it has been.
Thus, Judge Guido Calabresi recently observed:
[L]iberals ought to hate the exclusionary rule because the exclusionary rule, in my experience, is most responsible for the deep decline
in privacy rights in the United States. Indeed, the existence of the
exclusionary rule has been the reason for more diminutions m
privacy protection than anything else going on today.

** *
Judges-politicians' claim to the contrary notwithstanding-are not
in the business of letting people out on technicalities. If anything,
judges are in the business of keeping people who are guilty in on
technicalities ....
This means that in any close case, a judge will decide that the
search, the seizure, or the invasion of privacy was reasonable. That
case then becomes the precedent for the next case. The next close
case comes up and the precedent is applied: same thing, same thumb
on the scale, same decision. The hydraulic effect, . . . or the slippery
slope means that courts keep expanding what is deemed a reasonable search or seizure. 272
But critics of the exclusionary rule overlook that any effective
alternative to the exclusionary rule, such as a meaningful tort remedy or
administrative sanction, would also exert strong pressure to make the
rules governing search and seizure more "police-friendly." 273
272
273

See Calabresi, supra note 82; Slobogin, supra note 82.

If civil law suits against offending police officers were the primary means of
enforcing the Fourth Amendment, there would be great pressure to find the challenged
search "reasonable." The same would be true if the primary means of enforcement were
departmental discipline. The reason is that if damages were awarded with some regularity
against officers who violated the Fourth Amendment or if they were suspended without pay
or required to pay substantial fines, the police "would be afraid to conduct the searches
they should make." Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1016, 1053
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As Monrad Paulsen noted on the eve of the Mapp case:
Whenever the rules are enforced by meaningful sanctions, our
attention is drawn to their content. The comfort of Freedom's words
spoken in the abstract is always disturbed by their applications to a
contested instance. Any rule of police regulation enforced in fact will
generate pressure to weaken the rule. 274
There is no denying that one of the effects of the exclusionary rule
has been to diminish the protection the Fourth Amendment once provided-on paper. But a down-sized Fourth Amendment that is taken seriously is still a good deal better than an expansive, majestic Fourth
Amendment that exists only in a theoretical world. Moreover, diminution of the Fourth Amendment's scope is undoubtedly the price we
would have to pay for any means of enforcing the Amendment that had a
bite-for any remedy that actually worked.
As the previous section of this paper spells out at some length, that
price has been paid. However unrealistic search and seizure requirements may once have been, to a greater degree than ever before, they
are no longer "obstacle[s] in a game but only a protection against
arbitrary and capricious police action. " 275 That is why the case for
retaining the exclusionary rule today is even stronger than the case for
adopting it was in 1914 or 1961.
(1987). See also William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 443, 445 (1997): "[T]he usual legal tools [for enforcing the Fourth
Amendment l-damages, fines, criminal punishment-are likely to cause more harm than
good. If an officer faces serious loss whenever he makes a bad arrest, he will make fewer
bad arrests, but also many fewer good ones."
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Paulsen, supra note 171, at 256.
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Paulsen, supra note 152, at 66.
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